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Introduction
Many think that a true global society is impossible to achieve either
because nations ignore the decisions of international tribunals or choose
simply to dismiss their obligations under international agreements alto-
gether. Sadly, this rings true at times, at least in the context of interna-
tional trade. U.S. compliance with free trade agreements, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), can be challenging when
faced with regulatory policies that, on the one hand, appear protectionist
and, on the other, are authorized within the context of legitimate domestic
regulatory processes.
In adjudicating domestic regulatory policies, the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) decides the validity of those policies according to the GATT'
and its Covered Agreements; 2 in doing so, however, the international
agency directs member states in matters of domestic regulatory policy.3 In
this way, the WTO functions as an internal player in the formulation of
regulatory policy as much as an external adjudicator of those policies. In a
similar way, the WTO cannot ignore that its decisions and policies are ulti-
mately enforced within those same domestic regulatory structures.4 WTO
panels and domestic regulatory institutions can become more aligned and
work toward a more cohesive multilateral trade regime in a recognizable
procedure of reciprocal deference.
This paper asserts that a superior approach to adjudicating internal
regulatory policy encourages deference to domestic government structures
that implement legitimate domestic policy, but only to the extent that such
deference illuminates for the WTO panels the non-protectionist purpose of
a particular measure. While internal policies that directly discriminate
among products based on nationality or origin clearly violate the national
treatment requirements of Article III of GATT,5 it is the facially neutral
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, app. 1, 33 l.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSUJ. WTO panels occasionally look to other sources of inter-
national law, such as Article 31 of the Vienna Convention when dealing with issues of
treaty interpretation.
3. See generally GATT, supra note 1. The GATT establishes a wide range of provi-
sions instructing parties to the agreement on what trade and tariff policies should be
implemented and what types of policies are permissible. This level of power and control
demonstrates the WTO's ability to direct matters of domestic regulatory policy.
4. See GATT, supra note 1, Art. III; id., Annex I, ad. art. III.
5. GATT, supra note 1, Art. II1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 read as follows:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges,
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in
specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domes-
tic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to inter-
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regulatory measures with protectionist and discriminatory effects that are
more difficult to assess, even within transparent regulatory processes. 6 In
characterizing the national treatment analysis along the lines of the prod-
ucts themselves, however, the WTO panels ignore the possibility that a reg-
ulatory measure may have legitimate domestic purposes, even if it places
"incidental burdens" on trade.7 A procedural mechanism that places the
burden on those domestic regulatory processes closest to the measure in
question, namely the legislature, would encourage transparent implemen-
tation of each measure and ensure state compliance with WTO agree-
ments. Furthermore, WTO panels must consider the impact of their
decisions regarding national treatment on regional tribunals. In certain
instances, some measures may be better assessed at the regional level. The
Chapter 11 tribunal under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) recently stated in Methanex Corporation v. Government of the
United States that provisions adjudicated under GATT were not per se "to
be transported to investment provisions" under NAFTA.8 This is an impor-
tant assertion by the NAFTA tribunal, especially considering that several
prior NAFTA decisions previously deferred to WTO interpretations of
national treatment under GATT in adjudicating alleged national treatment
violations under NAFTA. 9 The extent to which regional tribunals, and sub-
sequently domestic courts, should and will defer to GATT jurisprudence is
unsettled. Clearly, Methanex represents both an attempt to distinguish the
regional tribunal adjudicatory process from that of the WTO in the NAFTA
context and a reminder of the lack of coordination that exists between the
two regimes. 10 In proposing a reciprocal deference approach for the WTO's
handling of regulatory measures, I will draw from parallel debates in U.S.
constitutional law, as well as decisions from the NAFTA tribunals. 1 1 There
nal taxes or internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall oth-
erwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Id.
6. See Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerck, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations:
A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITuTIONAL ISSUEs 283, 285 (Grainne de Buirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001), available
at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/howseasbestos.pdf (describing that member
states can "simply shift protectionism from explicit facially discriminatory measures, to
regulatory schemes that [are] covertly or structurally discriminatory").
7. See GATT, supra note 1, Art. Ill.
8. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits, Part 1ll, Ch. B, 9 37 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005) available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter Methanex, Final Award].
9. See infra Part Ill.
10. See Methanex, Final Award., supra note 8, at Part II, Ch. B, ' 6; id. at Part IV, Ch.
B, 9 37.
11. Robert E. Hudec and Daniel Farber wrote an interesting comparison of these two
doctrines in which they demonstrated ways that the laws under both the GATT and the
dormant Commerce Clause both deal with regulatory measures enacted through legiti-
mate local processes, but which in some way affect the competitive interests of those
outside the local legal domain. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A GATT's- Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv.
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are also important distinctions to be drawn among these legal regimes.
A WTO Panel decision lays out the problem at the regional level. The
High Fructose Corn Products case began as a dispute under the NAFTA
agreement, first as an antidumping case and more recently as an investor-
government dispute. 12 The U.S. investor-claimant, Corn Products Interna-
tional, brought a claim against the Mexican government in response to a
federal tax passed by the Mexican legislature on soda bottlers using high
fructose corn syrup as a sweetener instead of sugar. 13 No such tax was
passed for using sugar. 14 The investor, a U.S. corporation with the largest
market share within the Mexican high fructose corn syrup industry,
claimed that the Mexican government passed the tax in a way that violated
NAFTA Chapter 11 national treatment requirements.' 5 The case is cur-
rently pending before a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration panel. Interestingly,
on June 10, 2004, the U.S. government submitted a claim to the WTO
Panel to decide whether this Mexican tax violates Article III because it
treats "like and directly competitive or substitutable products" differ-
ently. 16 Unlike respondents in similar WTO cases, Mexico did not address
whether the products were "like" or not. Rather, Mexico alleged that the
WTO did not have jurisdiction over the NAFTA tribunal in deciding this
case, and it claimed that, as a developing country, it was entitled to special
and differential treatment. 17 Mexico also argued that the tax was justified
because of an ongoing sugar dispute involving Mexican access to the U.S.
sugar market.18 In 2005, the WTO Panel decided that the tax measure was
indeed a violation of Article III of GATT. 19 The extent to which this WTO
1401, 1403 (1994) (stating that the GATT and the dormant Commerce Clause share
common concerns). They continue to argue that "[t]he modern regulatory state inevita-
bly produces burdens on trade, if only because of the unavoidable lack of regulatory
uniformity. For various reasons, many of these burdens likely are unwarranted, and at
least some are in fact due to protectionist efforts by local industries. Yet, tribunals have
only a limited warrant to override the policy choices of local legislatures. Tribunals
must accord respect to the democratic process as well as to the prerogatives (or sover-
eignty) of local governments." Id.
12. Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, Corn Products International
v. United Mexican States, October 28, 2003. The antidumping dispute was decided by
the WTO in Panel Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000) (adopted Feb. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Mexico-HFCS] and a NAFTA Chapter 19 Tribunal in Review of the Final
Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup,
Originating from the United States of America, MEX-USA-98-1904-01 (Aug. 3, 2001).
13. Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, Corn Products, '1 54.
14. Id.
15. Id. 111 82-84. In addition, the claimant asserts that such a tax amounts to a
performance requirement prohibited under 1106 and expropriates his investment under
1110. Id. P1 91-93, 98; see also NAFTA, infra note 33, art. 1102.
16. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, WT/DS308/4,June 11, 2004. The claimant
alleges violations under Articles 111:1, 111:2 and 111:4 of GATT. Id.
17. See Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages,
4.110, WT/DS308/R, Oct. 7, 2005 [hereinafter Mexico-Tax Measures].
18. Id. cT 4.71-4.108. It is important to note that the Mexican sugar industry has
traditionally been regulated and protected by the Mexican government.
19. See id. 11 8.155-8.157.
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decision will impact the outcome of the Chapter 11 case is unclear, but it is
likely that, after Methanex, the WTO decision will be less persuasive than
in prior NAFTA decisions, in which the tribunals looked to GATT deci-
sions for guidance. 20 Notably, the damages under a NAFTA Chapter 11
dispute differ from those available in a WTO dispute. 2 1 Although the
WTO may be correct in finding the tax protectionist, this case raises inter-
esting questions regarding the adjudication of national treatment disputes,
WTO removal from issues better settled at the regional level, and WTO
deference to regional tribunals and the domestic political processes when
dealing with questions of legitimate internal regulatory policies.
The GATT agreement, as amended to include other Uruguay Round
agreements, is the document that lays out the obligations of member states
regarding tariff and subsidy reductions.2 2 Article III of GATT recognizes
that regulatory measures outside the scope of tariffs and subsidies can
amount to non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) and, therefore, undermine
multilateral efforts to reduce trade barriers more generally. 2 3 One of the
primary goals of Article III is to invalidate domestic regulatory measures,
including taxes that amount to NTBs. 2 4 Such barriers undermine the eco-
nomic goals of free trade. 25 The GATT Dispute Settlement Body, which
today falls under the aegis of the World Trade Organization, and the WTO
Appellate Body are the adjudicating bodies for determining whether the
actions of member states are in compliance with the obligations under the
WTO agreements. 26 Generally, in dealing with domestic regulatory mea-
sures under Article III of GATT, the WTO panels focus on the "likeness" of
the products in question.2 7 More specifically, the panels care about the
extent of the competitive substitutability between the products in ques-
tion.28 WTO panels make their determinations according to the covered
agreements and do not look to other sources of international law except in
20. See infra Parts III, IV.
21. The remedy under NAFTA Chapter 11 is in the form of monetary damages
imposed against a guilty government by the private investor. On the other hand, a viola-
tion found by a WTO dispute settlement body allows the innocent government to retali-
ate against the guilty government. See NAFTA, infra note 33, art. 1135; see also DSU,
supra note 2.
22. See GATT, supra note 1.
23. See id. at Part 11, art, Ill.
24. See id. at Part II, art. Il, ' 1.
25. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 5 (1969) (stating that
one of the goals of GATT law is to ensure "efficient allocation of resources and the
maximization of economic product").
26. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement]; see also DSU, supra note 2, at arts. 2, 17.
27. Appellate Body Report, European Comniunities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, 84-154, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), reprinted
in 40 I.L.M. 1193 (2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos].
28. See id.; see infra Part L.A (discussing traditional application of the "like products"
test according to the Border Tax Adjustments and to the competitive substitutability of
the products).
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rare instances. 29 Many specific regulatory measures, including those deal-
ing with health, technical and licensing matters, intellectual property, and
investment measures, are also adjudicated under the covered agreements. 30
They also do not generally defer to the decision-making power of regional
tribunals in making their determinations.3 1 Regional agreements such as
NAFTA3 2 incorporate mechanisms through which Parties may convene
regional tribunals to remedy alleged violations. 33 NAFTA, however, does
specifically allow for Parties to settle some issues before the WTO dispute
settlement body.34 Furthermore, NAFTA Parties tend to defer by analogy
to WTO determinations in interpreting provisions under NAFTA, and
NAFTA tribunals have recognized this deference. 3 5 For this reason, WTO
determinations can impact adjudication of similar matters at the regional
level and, therefore, WTO panels must factor this into their own adjudica-
tory formulae.
Recent WTO panels generally deal with domestic regulatory measures
in Article III of GATT, where the panels tend to focus on the "likeness" of
the products affected and the discriminatory nature of the regulatory mea-
sure in question.3 6 Furthermore, unlike in the context of U.S. commerce
clause jurisprudence, WTO panels do not distinguish between measures
with discriminatory effects and those applied even-handedly but with "inci-
29. WTO panels occasionally look to other sources of international law such as Arti-
cle 31 of the Vienna Convention when dealing with issues of treaty interpretation. See
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 157, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
30. See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
including annexes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, including annexes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreements on Trade
in Goods; Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods. Note
that all of these agreements either specifically refer to Article III of GATT in ensuring
that permissive measures do not amount to non-tariff trade barriers or state that
national treatment obligations must be respected.
31. See generally H.C. Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, Dispute Settlement in the WTO (Oct.
2005), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=2671
(discussing WTO standard of review).
32. NAFTA is a free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico
[hereinafter Parties]. See NAFTA, infra note 33.
33. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289, 296-456, 605-800 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
34. See, e.g., id. art. 2005.
35. See infra Part III (discussing NAFTA chapter 11 cases in which the NAFTA chap-
ter 11 tribunals, in defining "like circumstances" under NAFTA chapter 11, deferred to
WTO determinations regarding Article III of GATT ).
36. See, e.g., EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, 'VT 96-97; Panel Report, United
States-Taxes on Automobiles, WT/DS31/R (Sept. 29, 1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Taxes on
Automobiles]; Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt-Bever-
ages, WT/DS23/R-39S/206 (Mar. 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992) [hereinafter
U.S. -Malt Beverages].
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dental burdens" on trade. 3 7 There are other types of regulation that the
"like products" test cannot properly settle. For example, the test does not
distinguish between regulatory measures in place to create economic devel-
opment and those that are adopted merely to oust competition. 38 Further-
more, the test cannot accommodate measures deriving from traditionally
regulated domestic markets that begin to deregulate in certain sectors.
3 9
Free trade agreements thrive, at least in the short-term, in part by encour-
aging competition in those market sectors that have traditionally been regu-
lated. In the case of Mexico, for example, the sugar industry has been
highly regulated in the past and remains regulated in some aspects. 40 Like-
wise, the Mexican government has required that its primary telecommuni-
cations service provider, Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de CV. (Telmex) open
its networks for use by other authorized Mexican companies, two of which
are U.S. affiliated.4 1 With respect to U.S. electricity markets, there has
been a push for pro-competition policies that convert a traditionally regu-
lated monopoly into a "partially" regulated market.4 2 Within this type of
regulatory framework, even U.S. antitrust law seems unable to distinguish
precisely between anti-competitive policies and pro-competitive ones.
4 3
The WTO panel's attempt to define "anti-competitive" practices in Mex-
ico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services may have over-reaching
and unintended effects. 44 At the same time, the Article III "like products"
test is even less equipped to settle the issue. WTO panels run the risk of
invalidating otherwise legitimate regulatory policy, particularly via facially
37. See infra Part II.C (defining "incidental burdens" in the context of the U.S. dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
38. See, e.g., Report of the Panel for Conciliation, Italian Discrimination Against
Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833-7S/60 (July 15, 1958) (recognizing that regula-
tory measures may foster domestic economic development and not be in violation of
GATT). See infra Part I.B.ii for detailed discussion.
39. See, e.g., Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R, (June 1, 2004) (recognizing that telecommunications are partially regu-
lated by the Mexican government but concluding that Mexico was in violation of its
commitments under Reference Paper, April 24, 1996 and the GATS Annex by failing to
prevent anti-competitive behavior by its largest service provider, Telmex) [hereinafter
Mexico- Telecommunications].
40. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Section B of Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Corn Products International, Inc. v.
United Mexican States, '1 27-32, Jan. 28, 2003.
41. See Mexico-Telecommunications, supra note 39, 9 2.2. Some of the U.S. affiliated
carriers are Worldcom, through Avantel, and AT&T, through Alestra. Id.
42. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regu-
lated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1352-55 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Feder-
alism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 1768 (2002); Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with
Deregulation: Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
349 (2006). But cf. John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust
Harmonization 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 552 (2003) (proposing a "limited and mod-
est antidiscrimination international antitrust regime located within the WTO" with a
rationale "com[ing] principally from international trade law rather than antitrust law").
44. See Mexico-Telecommunications, supra note 39, 9l 7.222-45 (defining "anticom-
petitive practices" as "actions that lessen rivalry or competition in the market").
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neutral measures that affect or disadvantage outside competition but do
not necessarily directly or intentionally protect inside competition. In
doing so, the WTO may unwittingly take on a more sovereign role, setting
trade norms and creating law with respect to domestic regulatory
measures.
45
In a regulatory model approach to the WTO, this increased sovereignty
for setting standards may be a desirable outcome. 46 Uniform standards
regarding health, labor, safety, and environmental issues could help har-
monize the domestic regulatory measures of member states. 4 7 Even if uni-
form regulatory standards are a long-term aspiration for free trade and
globalization, uniformity may produce resentment among members. Ulti-
mately, the WTO depends on its member states to implement and abide by
these standards. 48 Under a regulatory model approach for eliminating
NTBs, WTO panels will inevitably alienate member states from the GATT
multilateral regime and encourage a push towards regionalism. 4 9 Further-
more, it will widen the present disconnect between the GATT regime and
trade regimes under regional trade agreements. 50 The challenge for WTO
panels is to respect legitimate domestic regulatory policies while still
implementing international standards that allow for predictable adjudica-
tion of domestic regulatory policy. Although it is not the role of WTO
panels to decide whether domestic measures are legitimate as a matter of
substantive law, they must have some procedural basis upon which to
assess their legitimacy. A regulatory model would be weak in formulating
these assessments. Procedural mechanisms that place the burden on mem-
ber states to maintain transparent political processes and prove the need
for regulatory measures would promote coordination among the WTO,
member states, and regional tribunals. Under such reciprocal deference, the
WTO may have an impact at the domestic level rather than solely as an
outside enforcer of free trade.
45. See generally Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 247 (2004) (arguing that the
WTO dispute settlement system is constrained by international legal discourse and
politics as well as constitutional structure). Professor Steinberg characterizes the present
GATT dispute settlement system as one "more legalized and fundamentally more adjudi-
cative" than diplomatic. See id. at 250. He also discusses various forces influencing the
WTO's decision-making process through its dispute settlement system and questions the
suggestion by many scholars that "expansive judicial lawmaking might undermine the
political support of powerful states for the WTO." See id. at 257.
46. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary: The World Trade Con-
stitution, 114 HARv. L. REV. 511, 517-19 (2001) (identifying deficiencies in the regula-
tory model).
47. See Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty
Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 267, 274-82 (2004) (discussing the definition of
"harmonization").
48. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 530-36.
49. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 257 (stating that undermining political support
by powerful member states would "be politically devastating, as it is well established
that multilateral organizations that are not supported by the world's most powerful
states will either collapse or become irrelevant.").
50. See id. at 267.
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Part I of the paper will discuss protectionism, as seen through the eyes
of WTO dispute resolution bodies. It will consider important issues aris-
ing under domestic regulatory law that Article III of GATT is not equipped
to resolve. It will also take a closer look at the principles of national treat-
ment, and demonstrate that WTO applications of this doctrine are at cross
purposes. On the one hand, WTO panels have exhibited a willingness to
delve into the purpose of domestic measures to determine whether they are
protectionist. 5 1 On the other hand, recent WTO panels also seem more
inclined to focus on the competitive substitutability of the products and on
whether the measure treats them differently.5 2 Under the latter approach,
the legitimacy of the regulatory measure itself is no longer factored in the
national treatment equation. This part will demonstrate that in
EC-Asbestos, the WTO panels seem more willing to consider the regulatory
measure in question as part of the larger equation for "like products" anal-
ysis without burdening themselves with the task of finding a legitimate pur-
pose behind the regulatory measure. Finally, Part I will examine the
difficulty in differentiating national treatment violations from legitimate
regulatory policy.
Part II attempts to find solutions examining similar debates in U.S.
law. It will take a closer look at the questions that the "like products" test
of Article III of GATT cannot address. It will draw upon comparisons to
the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in dealing with these
issues and propose ways that the WTO panels may find these comparisons
useful. I suggest, however, that because the WTO and the U.S. courts deal
with different sets of concerns, important distinctions between the two sys-
tems in dealing with trade must be also be considered. Finally, this part
will recommend that WTO panels distinguish between facially neutral
measures with discriminatory effects and those with only "incidental bur-
dens" on trade. It will examine two main approaches for the WTO: the
regulatory model and the anti-discrimination model. 53 This part will bor-
row from both models in proposing that WTO panels defer to domestic
regulatory processes in dealing with those facially neutral, internal mea-
sures that have other legitimate purposes. In doing so, the WTO panels
should not decide the legitimacy of these measures as a matter of substan-
tive domestic law. When in doubt, however, they should look to the
domestic regulatory processes in place and ask the legislatures to clarify
the legitimate purpose and demonstrate that the measure in question is in
fact the "least restrictive means" of implementing domestic policy and oth-
erwise complies with the state's WTO obligations. 54 In this way, the WTO
encourages domestic internal regulatory processes to be transparent but
51. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products, '1 19, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
52. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, 'Hl 87-100, 120, 123.
53. See generally McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46.
54. See Alan Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 21-22 (1999) (explaining measures that amount to the "least restric-
tive means" of furthering legitimate state regulatory goals).
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also places the burden on those same domestic political institutions to
prove the need for the policy.
Part III will consider parallel discussions regarding domestic regula-
tion under NAFTA. It will also illuminate relevant questions unanswered
by the WTO panels' interpretation of Article III of GATT. It will emphasize
that the WTO panels can better align the interests of the multilateral trade
regime with those of regional agreements by considering the effects of its
decisions on the outcomes of similar disputes at the regional level. Fur-
thermore, Part III will demonstrate the willingness of the NAFTA tribunals
to look to domestic regulatory processes when deciding matters of regula-
tory policy. It will also show that Chapter 11 NAFTA tribunals implement
at times a balancing test which factors the need for the regulation at the
domestic level, against its potential interference with the objectives of
NAFTA. 5 5 There are lessons here for the WTO panels in adjudicating regu-
latory policy under Article III of GATT.
Finally, this article will conclude with an in-depth look at the impact
of Methanex on the future decision-making power of regional tribunals in
the context of national treatment violations. More specifically, Part IV will
consider the impact that Mexico-Tax Measures may have on the NAFTA
tribunal's decision on whether Mexico would owe damages to the U.S. for a
national treatment violation. 56 It will bring together lessons for the WTO
panels in the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the
NAFTA jurisprudence in dealing with internal regulatory measures. It will
also demonstrate that it is in the questions asked where the WTO panels
may learn the most. Furthermore, it will propose an alternative applica-
tion of Article III, which begins by focusing on the impact of a legitimate
regulatory measure on the competitiveness of the products and incorpo-
rates the measure into the "like products" test. Finally, in dealing with
facially neutral measures, Part IV will propose a reciprocal deference
approach, in which WTO panels defer to domestic regulatory structures in
finding answers to questions of legitimacy. Part IV does not propose to
give the domestic governments the last word on issues of legitimacy; it does
assert, however, that proof of legitimate measures can be better ascertained
at the domestic level, close to the institutions that implement the policy.
Therefore, by implementing procedural mechanisms in assessing infer-
ences of legitimacy, WTO panels can encourage more transparent domestic
internal regulatory structures and make legislatures accountable by requir-
ing proof of both the need of the measure and the absence of alternative
means more aligned with its commitments under WTO. Furthermore,
WTO panels can decide that certain matters would be better addressed at
the regional level, since regional agreements may better address the issues
at hand, and the regional tribunals are closer to the domestic regulatory
55. See, e.g., Methanex Final Award. supra note 8, 12; see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada, Partial Award, 40 l.L.M. 1408, cl 245-46 (2001) [hereinafter S.D. Myers, Par-
tial Award].
56. Closing Statement of the Panel, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, WT/DS 308 (Feb. 24, 2005).
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structures in question. In conclusion, through a different means of adjudi-
cating regulatory measures under Article III, the WTO panels can ensure
transparency within domestic regulatory structures and promote coordina-
tion and cohesiveness between the multilateral trade regime of GATT and
the regional and domestic regimes.
1. Protectionism and Domestic Regulation-Is There a Palpable
Difference under Article III of GATT?
A. Reconciling Domestic Regulation with Free Trade
In principle, Article III of GATT was designed to eliminate domestic
measures that in their application would discriminate between imported
and "like" domestic products and thereby effectively protect domestic pro-
ducers at the expense of foreign producers. 5 7 However, in their desire to
eliminate NTBs, the WTO Panels are setting norms for defining national
treatment violations based solely on product distinctions, their competitive
substitutability, and equal treatment.58 This kind of analysis, while
focused on preserving equal competitive opportunities and encouraging
market access, fails to consider that virtually any domestic regulatory mea-
sure is protectionist to some degree. 5 9
Traditional notions of globalization and the spread of free markets
have recently encountered obstacles which, ironically, regulation can help
amend. For example, when Japanese car companies decide whether to
build a plant in the United States or in Ontario, Canada, they consider the
costs of providing private health care and training U.S. employees versus
Canadian employees. 60 Interestingly, the Canadian government's ability to
offset healthcare costs has been a decisive factor in companies' choices to
invest in Canada rather than in the United States. 6 1
Presumably, legitimate regulatory policy supports the public welfare
of a state and accounts for market failures. 62 Furthermore, some domestic
57. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 279-80.
58. See Panel Report, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, §§ 5.5-5.10 (Nov. 10, 1987).
59. See Sykes, supra note 54, at 7 (recognizing that governments "have an array of
devices at their disposal for protecting domestic industries against outside competi-
tion"); see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 43-54 (1988) (describing most non-
tariff barriers as deriving from legitimate regulatory institutions which administer mea-
sures impacting imports); ANNE 0. KREUGER, ECONOMIC POLICIES AT CROSS PURPOSES,
108-31 (1993) (describing several U.S. regulatory measures, including antidumping
measures, that may be construed as protectionist).
60. See generally Paul Krugman, Toyota, Moving Northward, N.Y TIMES, July 25, 2005
at A19.
61. Id.
62. See Michael E. Levine &Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 167-98 (1990). But
see generally, Sykes, supra note 54. Professor Sykes demonstrates that "regulatory pro-
tectionism" is the least efficient kind of protectionist measure (as compared to tariffs,
quotas, and subsidies for example) because of the additional deadweight losses it pro-
duces on society and its tendency to further the effects of capture and transfer of rents
among self-interested politicians. See Sykes, supra note 54, at 5, 7-12.
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policies that impact consumer preferences may actually contribute to creat-
ing new markets. For example, a gas guzzler tax placed on domestic and
imported automobiles exceeding a specific miles per gallon ratio is a fiscal
measure intended to encourage consumers to buy more fuel-efficient cars
and, in turn, push manufacturers to produce more fuel-efficient cars.
63
United States-Taxes on Automobiles presented this problem. 64 In this case,
the panel determined the "likeness" of the automobiles in question based
on the "aim and effect" of the fiscal measures. 6 5 The panel focused on
whether the measure was designed to discriminate between domestic and
foreign automobiles.6 6 It used an "inherence" principle, determining that
the measure was not aimed at protecting a domestic industry because the
ability to produce fuel-efficient cars was not "inherent" in any one of the
parties involved. 6 7 Such a measure was not aimed at protecting the U.S.
automobile industry, even if it impacted some of Europe's less fuel-efficient
cars at the time. In the spirit of Malt-Beverages, the panel looked at
whether there was a bona fide regulatory purpose, and whether the mea-
sure would protect the domestic industry so that it would retain its compet-
itive advantage. 6 8 The panel decided that the fiscal measures were applied
even-handedly, and in a non-discriminatory fashion, and that they fur-
thered legitimate regulatory purposes other than to protect the U.S. car
industry.6 9
Furthermore, domestic policy intended to promote competition in cer-
tain markets traditionally regulated or "protected" by the state may fall prey
to WTO scrutiny. Conflicts may arise between free trade agreements and
domestic policy when domestic industrial policy protects a domestic
industry temporarily from foreign competition. 70 The "Emergency Action"
provision of GATT Article XIX actually contemplates and upholds certain
63. I.R.C. § 4064 (2006).
64. US-Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 36. Note that this case also involved a lux-
ury tax placed on certain vehicles valued beyond a threshold amount. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. For an explanation of the "inherence" test, see generally Michael J. Trebilcock &
Shiva K. Giri, The National Treatment Principle in International Trade Law, in HANDBOOK
OF INT'L TRADE, VOL. 11: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS
195-96 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan eds., 2005).
68. Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an
"Air and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 628-29 (1998), available at http://www.world
tradelaw.net/articles/hudecrequiem.pdf [hereinafter Hudec, Requiem].
69. Id. at 626-29.
70. See Daniel J. Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita, Antitrust or Competition Laws Viewed
in a Trading Context: Harmony or Dissonance?, in 2 LEGAL ANALYSIS, FAIR TRADE AND F[u-
MONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 269, 282-83, (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
Hudec eds., 1996) (stating that "the most frequent and widely experienced conflicts
between industrial policy and competition policy occur in circumstances in which a
domestic industry, having lost its competitiveness, is under heavy pressure from foreign
competitors"). In this context, governments "take steps to encourage the modernization
and/or restructuring of the domestic industry and to protect the industry temporarily
from foreign competition." Id. The authors also clarify that this type of restructuring
would normally come under the scope of the Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products of GATT Art. XIX. Id. at 283.
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types of trade restrictions that help a distressed domestic industry restruc-
ture itself. 71 These protections apply, however, primarily to measurable
injury due to imports. 72 Of particular difficulty is when these conflicts
arise outside the jurisdictional scope of Article XIX of GATT. 73 Where
domestic government intervention is legitimate under domestic law in the
form of regulation or market participation, domestic industry may be
inherently eligible for more protection than foreigners. 74 Antidumping
laws are not structured to deal with these issues. 75
Article III of GATT is not equipped to deal with these issues either.
Free trade agreements thrive on implementation of domestic pro-competi-
tive policies in traditionally regulated markets. One example lies in the
U.S. regulatory structure for electricity markets. U.S. electricity firms tra-
ditionally regulated both at the federal and state levels have been subjected
to deregulatory policy in certain sectors and states. 76 There has been
inconsistency among U.S. courts in determining which kind of anticompe-
titive behavior is still regulated and which is not, producing counterintui-
tive results for pro-competition policies. For example, expansive
applications of the U.S. state sovereign immunity doctrine that exempts
state-regulated industries from antitrust liability may actually further the
effects of capture in dominant suppliers already established in a tradition-
ally regulated market. 77 The "like products" test of Article III, as imple-
71. Id. at 285 (stating that "Illimitation of imports in connection with an industrial
policy which seeks to rescue and/or restructure a distressed domestic industry is... an
activity which the GATT itself contemplates."). The inherent challenge in Article XIX is
that defining when an emergency action is applicable also turns on the definition of
"like or directly competitive products." Id.
72. See id. at 5.
73. See id. at 283. The authors state that:
Viewed in the light of ensuring the survival of a domestic industry, crisis cartels
and associated import restrictions seem more tolerable interferences in the free
market .... Accordingly, measures which are designed as ad hoc efforts to res-
cue a troubled domestic industry with the ultimate objective of restoring market-
place competition cannot be seen as engendering substantial trade problems.
Id. at 287-88.
74. See Ian Wooten & Maurizio Zanardi, Antidumping versus Antitrust: Trade and
Competition Policy in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALY-
SES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTI-TUTIONS 383 -84 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan eds.,
2005) (stating that in the context of government regulation, "the instruments that are
available to a government to discipline a domestic firm are not accessible in the case of a
foreign-based enterprise").
75. Id. at 384 (asserting that "[tihe disadvantage of AD policies is that they do not
fully address the problem of inappropriate use of market power and, indeed, often
induce more distortions in the market than they resolve and are often captured by spe-
cial interests").
76. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regu-
lated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1354-55 (1998).
77. See, e.g., Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience in Electric
Utility Deregulation, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2002); Rossi, supra note 43, at 1770; Tru-
jillo, supra note 43, at 353-54 (discussing the expansion of the state action immunity
clause in the deregulated electricity industry as being a means of furthering the effects
of capture in dominant suppliers already existing in those markets prior to implementa-
tion of deregulatory policies).
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mented by WTO panels, focuses on the products themselves rather than
the regulatory measure or the regulatory framework.78 With this narrow
focus, the test cannot cope with domestic deregulatory policies or the
impact that such policies may have on foreign competition within those
markets.
In Mexico-Tax Measures, it is not irrelevant that the need for access to
U.S. markets for surplus sugar production arose from a regulatory struc-
ture in Mexico that traditionally protected Mexican sugar growers. 79 The
Mexican sugar industry was attempting to cope with the transition of open-
ing its market to private investment, particularly foreign investment.80
Mexico alleged that U.S. non-compliance with prior agreements to provide
market access to the Mexican sugar industry justified its adoption of a
sugar tax to handle the sugar surplus problem.8 ' In the NAFTA context,
the dispute in the Methanex case arose out of a California regulation ban-
ning the use of methanol in reformulated gasoline because the state gov-
ernment found the additive to be a health and environmental risk.
8 2
Neither the WTO panel nor the regional tribunals seem equipped to deal
with these kinds of questions, and the "like products" test does not make
room for these inquiries either. Perhaps the founders of the WTO and
other regional tribunals did not design the panels to solve these issues at
all. Yet some regional agreements, such as NAFTA, contemplate trade in
areas traditionally subject to government regulation, sometimes even more
so than in the United States.8 3 The WTO Panel, in its adjudication of Arti-
cle III, should recognize these complexities within the framework of its cov-
ered agreements and encourage member states to better deal with the
issues at the domestic level.
B. Article III at Cross Purposes
The GATT dispute settlement and appellate bodies have struggled over
the years with the application of the "like products" test under Article III of
GATT.8 4 Paragraphs one and two of Article III are the internal tax provi-
sions.8 5  The former provides a general principle of non-protectionism
78. Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 624-26, 634-35.
79. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, 1 4.179.
80. Id. 9 4.89.
81. See id. ' 4.122.
82. See Methanex, Final Award, supra note 8, at Part II, c1 1-25.
83. See NAFTA, supra note 33, Chapter 6, arts. 601-09. Article 602 of NAFTA
allows Mexico many reservations for cross-border trade in energy since the energy sector
is highly regulated and constitutionally protected. See STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN
LAW 285 (2004) (discussing economic and environmental regulation).
84. GATT distinguishes between tariff duties and other kinds of taxes such as inter-
nal taxes. Internal taxes are collected after the goods exit customs and enter into domes-
tic commerce. However an Interpretative Note clarified that a tax collected at the time
the product is in customs could still be construed to be an internal tax. Furthermore,
exemptions from income taxes are not covered under Article Ill. See JACKSON, supra note
25, at 280; see also GATT, supra note 1, Annex 1, ad. art. Ill.
85. See RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 423 (2d ed.
2001) (explaining that paragraph one of Article Ill sets forth a general principle applica-
ble not only to internal taxes but also to internal legislation and regulations more gener-
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with respect to internal taxes and regulations.8 6 The latter is much more
specific as to the obligations of member states when dealing with internal
taxation and "like domestic products."' 7 Article III, paragraph four
addresses non-fiscal measures that treat products of foreign origin "less
favorably" than "like products" of national origin. 8 8 In writing Article II1,
the drafters sought to prevent internal measures that would discriminate
between imported and "like" domestic products, creating a "constructive
tariff' on imports and effectively benefiting domestic producers. 89 The dif-
ferences in the first two sentences of Article III's second paragraph result in
a two-tiered objective with problematic results.90 On the one hand, Article
III attempts to eradicate internal measures that are protectionist in
nature.9 1 In doing this, however, it also seems to disallow measures that
have protectionist effects, even if the measures do not necessarily discrimi-
nate between imported products and like domestic products. 92 Because
this seems contrary to Article IIl's purpose, the panels have focused on the
first sentence of the second paragraph, which is clearly intended to prevent
discriminatory measures on imported products also produced domesti-
ally; on the other hand, paragraph two of Article III deals with internal taxes
specifically).
86. GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:1.
87. See id., art. 111:2; see also Jackson, supra note 25, at 279.
88. The fourth paragraph of Article Ill of GATT states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regu-
lations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not
on the nationality of the product. GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:4.
Much of the discussion regarding the scope of "like products" under Article 111:4 con-
cerns whether Article 111:4 deals only with "like products" but not necessarily "directly
competitive or substitutable" products. Arguably, Article 111:1 does not apply to Article
111:4, thereby not requiring the determination of whether the non-fiscal measure was
passed "so as to afford protection." See Trebilcock & Gibi, supra note 67, at 195-96.
89. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 279-80.
90. The first sentence of Art. 111:2 specifically refers to "like domestic products" in
order to prevent internal measures from discriminating between these products based
on their origin. See id. at 281; see also GATT, supra note 1, art. 111. The second sentence
of Art. 111:2 incorporates the more general obligation of Art. 111:1 that member states
should not pass internal measures that "afford protection to domestic production." See
GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:2; see also JACKSON, supra note 25, at 281.
91. See GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:1.
92. See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integra-
tion, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 29 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (noting that the Panel's focus on the Border Tax
Adjustments criteria may be "underinclusive," allowing some protectionist measures,
and "overinclusive," invalidating legitimate domestic legislation that places no major
burdens on free trade). See generally, Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in WTO
Law: National and Most-Favored Nation Treatment- or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. of World
Trade 921 (2002), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/013201.
html (highlighting and exploring the question of whether national treatment violations
under Article III include facially origin-neutral measures that have no or very little over-
all protective effect on domestic industries).
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cally.9 3 In principle, the scope of the fourth paragraph is broader than the
second paragraph. 9 4 However, they work in tandem since fiscal measures,
as well as non-fiscal ones, may frustrate trade in similar ways. In sum, the
purpose of Article III is to prevent member states from passing fiscal and
non-fiscal regulatory measures that are intended to protect domestic prod-
ucts at the expense of their foreign counterparts. Arguably, GATT does not
go so far as to eliminate all market protection; rather, it performs a moni-
toring function and guarantees that such protections work within the strict
parameters of GATT as enforced by the WTO. 9 5 Therefore, part of the pur-
pose of Article III is also to ensure a level playing field when it comes to
competition by eliminating NTBs that protect domestic production at the
expense of a comparable foreign import.9 6
While interpretations of GATT clarify that an internal tax levied on
both imported and "like" domestic products is an internal tax even though
the tax is levied on imported goods at the time of importation, GATT pro-
vides no guidance where "like" products are not involved. 97 At times,
GATT panels focused solely on the products themselves, specifically on
whether products were treated differently and were competitively substitut-
able.98 In this way, the panels narrowed the scope of the test while broad-
ening the meaning of "like." At other times, the panels broadened the
scope of the test by considering the purpose and the effects of the regula-
tory measure at hand in assessing the "likeness" of the products them-
selves. 99 This perspective shifts the focus from the competitiveness of the
93. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 281-82 (If "a measure complies with the first
sentence is it possible that it can nevertheless contravene the second sentence? The
answer appears to be clearly 'yes"'). The original language of Article III in the Havana
Charter included the following:
[I]n cases in which there is no substantial domestic production of like-products
of national origin, no contracting parties shall apply new or internal taxes on
the products of the territories of other contracting parties for the purpose of
affording protection to the production of directly competitive or substitutable
products which are not similarly taxed; and existing internal taxes of this kind
shall be subject to negotiation for their reduction or elimination.
Id. at 281. This language was later eliminated and the Interpretative Note specified that
Article III obligation attached to products that were "directly competitive or substitut-
able products." Id. at 282.
94. See Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 632.
95. PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 15 (2004) (stating that the WTO does not "disallow
market protection; rather it sets some strict disciplines under which governments may
choose to respond to special interests").
96. See generally Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards:
The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996) (discussing gener-
ally ideas behind the "'level-playing-field' complaint" and demonstrating it as a doctrine
of "fairness" in trade matters); see also EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, 98, at 37 (stating
that Article III eliminates disguised trade restrictions that "affect[ ] the competitive rela-
tionship, in the marketplace, between the domestic and imported products involved, 'so as
to afford protection to domestic production').
97. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 289.
98. See Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 624-26.
99. See, e.g., Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides
and the Import of Finished Leather, 9 8.230, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
11ol1. 4 0
2007 Mission Possible
products to the legitimacy of the regulatory measure-a question that WTO
panels may not be in a position to assess. Under either approach, however,
the claimants, in asserting a national treatment violation, must first estab-
lish whether a "like product" is involved.10 0
For the most part, WTO decisions regarding national treatment under
Article III distinguish between regulatory measures that discriminate on
their face against foreigner (de jure discrimination) and facially neutral
measures that do not discriminate based on origin but nevertheless have a
"disproportionate impact" on foreign goods (de facto discriminatory). 10
However, the same rules apply to both: if the goods or services in question
are "like," they are in violation of Article III unless they can be justified as
"necessary" violations under Article XX' 0 2 In determining "likeness"
under Article III, however, panels have collapsed facially non-discrimina-
tory measures that only have protectionist effects on imports with those
that have protectionist effects but are justified as furthering other legiti-
mate regulatory objectives. 10 3 Arguably, panels deal with this distinction
under Article XX, which creates specific exemptions for a measure that
would otherwise be a national treatment violation. Under Article XX, the
respondent has the burden of proving that the measure is "necessary" per
Article XX.
1 0 4
Until European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos
Containing Products,'0 5 GATT panels were divided in dealing with national
treatment problems between the approach in Japan -Tax on Alcoholic Bever-
100. See Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R,
WT/DS11/R, 1996 WL 406720, (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Bever-
ages] (asserting that complainant has the burden of proof in demonstrating that prod-
ucts are "like products" and that foreign products are taxed in excess of domestic ones);
see also, Edward S. Tsai, "Like" is a Four-Letter Word- GATT Article Ill's "Like Product"
Conundrum, 17 BERKELEYJ. INT'L LAW 26, 37-38 (1999) (stating that after the 1987 Alco-
holic Beverages Panel decision, the test for national treatment consisted of three steps:
"1) whether products are like; 2) whether the contested measure is an 'internal tax' or
'other internal charge' . . . ; and 3) whether the tax imposed on foreign products is in
excess of the tax imposed on like domestic products"). Furthermore, in cases where it is
not so clear if products are "like,"
[a] tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 [of
Art. ll] would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the sec-
ond sentence [of Art. 111:21 only in cases where there was competition between,
on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competi-
tive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE,
ad. art. III 1 2 (2003).
101. See Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 620.
102. Id. at 621-22.
103. See Sykes, supra note 54, at 4-5 (recognizing that some regulations may have
"protective effects" but may be justified because of a "nonprotectionist regulatory objec-
tive"). The author refers to these measures as the "'least restrictive means"' and pur-
ports to exclude these types of measures as those constituting "regulatory
protectionism." Id.
104. See, e.g., Panel Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 17 5.67-68, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26, 2004).
105. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, 'VI 96-97.
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ages (the 1987 decision)1 0 6 and that in United States-Measures Affecting
Alcoholic and Malt-Beverages.10 7 In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the U.S.,
European Union, and Canada claimed that a Japanese tax scheme, in
which certain imported alcoholic beverages were subject to a higher inter-
nal tax than the domestically produced schochu, discriminated against for-
eign exporters to Japan. 10 8 Whereas Japan offered a highly restrictive
interpretation of "like product," claimants proved that imported spirits
were "like products" to the Japanese spirits, schochu, by virtue of being
"directly competitive and substitutable." 10 9
Despite this tendency of WTO panels to focus solely on the competi-
tive substitutability of products, and the unequal treatment of a regulatory
measure as to those products, one panel decision demonstrated the WTO's
willingness to consider legitimate domestic measures as part of the equa-
tion. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages consid-
ered the possibility of legitimate domestic measures that, though
discriminatory as between domestic and imported products, may not nec-
essarily violate Article III because of its protectionist intent. 1 0 This case
involved U.S. tax schemes on alcoholic beverages at both the federal and
state levels, as well as other local restrictions on transportation and distri-
bution of alcoholic beverages. I11 Most notable was a Mississippi excise tax
that set a lower rate for wines made from a specific grape, the vitus
rotundifola grape. 1 12 This measure benefited the Mississippi producers
that relied heavily on the grape. 113 Therefore, the effect of the tax measure
was to provide lower tax rates on domestic beer and wine than on "like"
imported products.' 1 4
Unlike 1987 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the panel took a different
approach in determining whether this tax violated Article III, an approach
seemingly more consistent with the purpose of Article III. It did not solely
rely on the determination of whether the products in question were "like."
106. See GATT Dispute Panel Report, Japan-Customs, Duties, Taxes and Labeling Prac-
tices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216-34S/83, 1987 WL 421964
(GATT) (Oct. 13, 1987) (adopted Nov. 10, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages].
107. See U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36.
108. The claimants alleged that this tax scheme applied different tax rates to "like"
products and therefore violated the national treatment obligations under Article Ill; the
other alcoholic beverages included vodka, gin, brandy, etc. Id. 2.3.
109. In the first Panel decision, the WrO Panel rejected Japan's position and took a
flexible approach in defining "like products." In supporting a case by case analysis for
interpreting the terms, the Panel concluded that "like" in this case could refer not only to
the same physical characteristics and end uses but also to "directly competitive or substi-
tutable products" having common end-uses even if their physical characteristics differ.
See 1987Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 106.
110. U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36.
111. Also, among other state measures Canada alleged were in violation of Article Ill,
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act required federal permits for all wholesalers. Id.
c1 2.1.
112. Id. 1 5.23-26.
113. Id.
114. Id. '1 5.1.
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Rather, in making this determination, the panel considered the purpose of
the domestic measure in question, and whether it was enacted with the
"aim and effect" of protectionism.1 15 Although the panel invalidated the
tax as violating Article III, it arrived at this conclusion in a much different
manner than it did later in 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages. The panel's
analysis of whether the measure was discriminatory against "like domestic
products" did not only turn on whether the products shared certain physi-
cal characteristics or were "directly competitive or substitutable." Instead,
it stated that this determination must consider whether the purpose of the
measure was itself protectionist.1 16 The panel concluded that the purpose
of Article III was not to prevent member states from "using their fiscal and
regulatory powers [in ways] other than to afford protection to domestic pro-
duction."1 17 Furthermore, it stressed that the focus of the "like products"
analysis must be whether such a distinction furthers the purpose of a non-
discriminatory regulation that is not intended to be a non-tariff trade
restriction, even if such regulation has the effect of restricting trade.1 18
Though the panel in U.S. -Malt Beverages provided no guidance as to the
types of measures that could be legitimate because they are not intended to
"afford protection," the panel did recognize that distinctions can be drawn
between regulatory measures intended to protect and those having protec-
tionist effects but serving other legitimate regulatory objectives.1 1 9
Of course the most obvious problem with the analysis in U.S.-Malt
Beverages is that it requires a Panel to discern the legislative intent of the
measure. 120 The Panel's decision regarding the Mississippi tax was aided
by a U.S. concession that the differing tax schemes served no regulatory
purpose "other than to subsidize small local producers.' 12 1 However, the
U.S. -Malt Beverages decision reinforces the notion that Article III does not
115. See generally Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68 (stating that the United States' fiscal
measures were non-discriminatory and thus legal); see also Tsai, supra note 100, at
35-36 (citing U.S.-Malt Beverages' use of the "aim-and-effect" test in CH 5.12-15 and
emphasizing that under this one-step test, "the sole determination [is] whether or not a
measure was a protectionist measure").
116. Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1423 (stating that the GATT panel "concluded
that the 'likeness' issue must always turn on the purpose for which the product distinc-
tion is being tested").
117. U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36; see also Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at
1423 (stating that "the purpose of Article Ill 'like product"' standard [was] to distin-
guish between protectionism and good faith regulation"). Instead, the purpose of Article
Ill, was as described under Article 111:1, not to allow internal measures that are applied
"so as to afford protection to domestic production." U.S. -Malt Beverages, supra note 36,
cl 5.25; see also GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:1.
118. U.S. -Malt Beverages, supra note 36 (holding that the purpose of Article IllI "like
product" standard is to distinguish between protectionism and good faith regulation, the
decision concluded that the "likeness" of the 2 products must depend on whether any
non-trade regulatory purpose was served by distinguishing between the 2 types of
wine").
119. U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36.
120. U.S.-Malt Beverages and U.S.-Taxes on Automobiles seem to suggest that for
there to be a violation of Article 111:2, the measure be motivated by a legislative intent to
protect domestic industry. See generally Tsai, supra note 100.
121. U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36, 1 5.26.
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necessarily require absolutely equal treatment of "like" products, particu-
larly when domestic measures are adopted for reasons other than to protect
domestic industry.' 2 2 Rather, it targets those measures that treat imported
goods less favorably than "like" domestic goods for the purpose of granting
an advantage to the domestic goods at the expense of the imported one. 12 3
The panel recognized the importance of making "the like product determi-
nation in the context of Article III... in such a way that it not unnecessarily
infringe upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy options of con-
tracting parties."1 24
The subsequent 1996 Appellate Body decision of Japan-Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages, however, decided that the "aims and effects" approach was
not the proper interpretation of Article III's second paragraph. 12 5 Instead,
it reinforced the panel's decision that the Border Tax Adjustments were the
guiding criteria, along with competitive substitutability.' 26 Therefore, the
focus in determining "substitutability" or "likeness" shifted to the physical
characteristics of the products, their end-uses, consumer tastes, and the
tariff classification of the products.12 7 If a regulation treats the "like prod-
ucts" differently, notwithstanding the purpose of the regulation, then it vio-
lates Article III. This analysis does not contemplate the purpose of the
regulation. 128 Rather, it collapses facially discriminatory measures with
facially neutral ones that have only discriminatory effects; focuses on the
equal treatment of the "like products"; and ignores the possibility of legiti-
mate, non-protectionist regulatory objectives. 129 While the Appellate Body
122. See Roessler, supra note 92, at 29 (stating that "the starting point of the analysis
cannot be the concrete objects to which an internal tax or regulation is applied but only
the abstract categories of products distinguished by the contracting party").
123. See id. Roessler also distinguishes between policies that discriminate between
domestic and foreign products and policies that merely discriminate between different
categories of products regardless of their origin. Id.
124. U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 36, 1 5.72.
125. See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/
AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body].
126. The Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments provides a set of criteria
that Panels have used in interpreting the "likeness" of products. These criteria include
the following:
1. physical characteristics of a product including its properties, nature, and
quality;
2. the end-uses of a product in any given market;
3. the tastes and habits of consumers' tastes and habits, which may vary; and
4. the tariff classification of the products.
See Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, '118, L/3464 (adopted Dec.
2, 1970). Whether the products fall under the same tariff classification (HTS) is an
important factor in determining similar physical characteristics but it in itself is not
conclusive. See 1987Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 106.
127. 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 100, 6.15.
128. Unlike the 1987 panel decision, the Appellate Body emphasized that Article 111:2
should be read in light of the purpose of Article 111:1: "the broad and fundamental pur-
pose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and regula-
tory measures." 1996 Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body, supra note 125, at 16.
129. 1958 Panel Report on Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural
Machinery stated that "it was considered ... that the intention of the drafters of the
GATT was clearly to treat the imported products in the same way as the like domestic
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stated that the first sentence of Article 111:2 should be read in light of the
purpose laid out in paragraph one-"to avoid protectionism"-its emphasis
on the Border Tax Adjustments and the "likeness" of the products seems to
undermine this purpose. 130 The WTO panels' analysis does not distin-
guish between, on the one hand, regulatory measures meant to protect
domestic products, and on the other, measures that are facially non-dis-
criminatory and intended to further other legitimate "non-protectionist"
goals, but, nevertheless, have incidental protectionist effects. The common
result is that where there is unequal treatment, the panels almost always
find a national treatment violation. This emphasis on equal treatment of
"like products" seems to miss the point. Article III is concerned with mea-
sures that afford protection to domestic producers at the expense of for-
eigners. 13 1 It does not ensure equal treatment, especially where equal
treatment to foreigners and domestic producers may be impossible with
certain regulatory measures.' 32 It was not until EC-Asbestos that the WTO
panels found an alternative to the model espoused in 1996 Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages.13 3
C. EC-Asbestos: A Step in a Different Direction
In European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products,134 the Appellate Body opened the door for expanding
the meaning of "like products" without reinstating the "aims and effects"
test of U.S. -Malt Beverages. Canada brought this case against France, chal-
lenging a French decree that prohibited importation of asbestos and prod-
ucts with asbestos fibers and imposed penalties for violations of the
products once they had been cleared through customs; otherwise, indirect protection
could be given." Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, supra
note 38, ' 11.
130. Id.; see also EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, H 95-97 (stating that the purpose of
the Article III provision of GATT was to eliminate domestic measures that were in place
"so as to afford protection to domestic production").
131. 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 100, '1 6.12-6.13.
132. Roessler, supra note 92, at 29 (1996) (stating that "the starting point of the anal-
ysis cannot be the concrete objects to which an internal tax or regulation is applied but
only the abstract categories of products distinguished by the contracting party"). But see
Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining are
Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 143, 168-69 (concluding that after EC-Asbestos,
"national treatment analysis of any regulatory categories would result either in a form of
implicit balancing of the regulatory purpose and the trade restriction or in a test which
captures both innocent and protectionist measures that disproportionately impact
imports"). See also Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 96, WT/DS302/AB/R (May 19, 2005)
(approving a bond requirement for both domestic and foreign producers of cigarettes
even though it gave an "extra burden" to foreign importers due to their smaller tax
bracket).
133. Trebilcock & Giri, supra note 67, at 189, 196 (characterizing the two different
approaches in the Article Ill decisions as either the "textual" approach taken in
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages or the "contextual" "aim and effects" test applied in U.S.-Malt-
Beverages).
134. See generally EC-Asbestos, supra note 27.
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decree. 13 5 The claimants alleged that this decree violated the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") as well as various provi-
sions of GATT, including Article III. The European community asked the
Appellate Body to reconsider the panel decision. 136
The European community claimed that the panel erred in finding
chrysotile asbestos fibers to be "like" polyvinyl alcohol cellulose and glass
fibers ("PCG fibers"), and that it erred in finding chrysotile-cement prod-
ucts, containing asbestos fibers, to be "like" fibro-cement products. 13 7 In
its reading of Article III, the European Community made an interesting
argument that the need to look into the legitimacy of regulatory policy is
itself within the purpose of Article 111.138 That is, the European Commu-
nity claimed that the panel mistakenly ignored the "very reason why the
[d]ecree single[d] out asbestos fibers; namely, the fact that asbestos fibers
[were] carcinogenic." 139 It claimed further that the comparison should
have been based on a larger category than the products themselves; specifi-
cally, the French decree denied competitive opportunities equally to "all
carcinogenic asbestos [fibers]."' 140 In this way, the determination of "like-
ness" would not establish the discrimination; rather, a conclusive finding
of "likeness" would only lead a panel to the next question regarding the
impact on trade due to the discriminatory effect of the regulatory measure.
This reading of Article III allows a panel to balance a measure's impact on
trade against its regulatory significance.
The Appellate Body agreed with the European Community's under-
standing of "like products.' 14 1 It stated that the question of "likeness"
between the products involved is actually a question "about the nature and
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products."'142 It
also stressed, however, that the kind of competitive relationship matters,
for just because products are in "some competitive relationship" does not
in itself amount to the products being "like."'143
The importance of the Appellate Body's decision in this case is in nar-
rowing the scope of the "like products" test under Article III. It allows for
comparison of categories of "like" imported products against categories of
135. See id. 1-2 (discussing French Decree No. 96-1133, decret no. 96-1133 relatif
a l'interdiction de l'amiante, pris en application du code de travail et du code de la
consummation).
136. Id. 'IN 4, 30.
137. Id. '1 30.
138. Id. 97-98.
139. EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, 32.
140. Id. 33. The opinion states that the European Community's interpretation of
"like" concluded that, "instead of comparing the products prohibited by the French
Decree at issue (all carcinogenic asbestos fibres), the Panel erroneously compared the
allegedly 'like' products with an arbitrary third category of products, namely 'fibres with
certain applications."' See id.
141. Id. 99.
142. Id. The Appellate Body went on to state that not all products in some competi-
tive relationship are necessarily "like products." Id.
143. Id.
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"like" domestic products. 14 4 The factor that distinguishes these categories
may include the regulatory measure itself, as long as it is legitimate and
contains a non-protectionist objective that furthers legitimate domestic
goals. In the EC-Asbestos case, the Appellate Body characterized the Bor-
der Tax Adjustments as a "framework" within which it may initially find
"likeness" among the products but, nevertheless, described this initial find-
ing as non-conclusive. 1 4 5 The analysis went one step further: it considered
the regulatory measure in question and decided whether it was connected
to the core of the product, which would distinguish it from another product
with similar end-uses. 14 6 That is, in the case of chrysotile asbestos fibers,
the fact that they were carcinogenic, and that the regulatory measure was
intended to address this harmful feature, indicated that these fibers were in
fact different from the PCG fibers. 14 7 Therefore, they were not "like
products." ' 4
8
In EC-Asbestos, the WTO Appellate Body did not focus on the purpose
of the regulatory measure, which would come closer to the "aims and
effects" test, but rather incorporated the legitimate regulatory measure in
its determination of whether chrysotile asbestos fibers and PCG fibers were
"like."'1 49 It examined the regulatory measure's effects without scrutinizing
the legislature's motive or intent. 150 Similar to its ruling in 1987
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body focused on the products
themselves, particularly their competitive relationship and market sub-
stitutability. 1 5 1 In EC-Asbestos, however, it found that the effect of the reg-
ulatory measure on the targeted products' market could impact their
substitutability.' 52 That is, consumer choices among the fibers would
change if they knew that one contained asbestos and the other did not.
Consumer choices, therefore, would affect fibers' end-uses as well. Finally,
the measure had a reasonable nexus to the distinctive aspect of the product
that was in need of regulation, namely the carcinogenic nature of chrysotile
asbestos. 153
144. Id. 1 98. See also, Lothar Ehring, supra note 92 (examining EC-Asbestos and the
Appellate Body's broadening of "like product" into groups of "like products" and
describing "less favorable treatment" as the second condition of the Article 111:4
analysis).
145. EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, '11 101-02 (stating that these criteria "provide a
framework for analyzing the 'likeness' of particular products" and are "simply tools to
assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence"); see also Howse &
Tuerk, supra note 6, at 289 (noting that "a finding of 'likeness,' on market-based criteria,
will not be dispositive of a finding of violation of Article 111:4.").
146. EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, l1 111-12.
147. Id. '1 114.
148. Id. cII 112-14.
149. Id. ' 103.
150. Id. 114.
151. Id. 1 103.
152. See Howse & Tuerk, supra note 6, at 288 (stating that the Appellate body in
EC-Asbestos reaffirmed the "basic purpose of Article III as the discipline of protectionist
measures" and not merely guaranteeing "market access" of like imported products).
153. EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, '1 114 (noting that the carcinogenic effects of asbes-
tos had been well-established).
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EC-Asbestos is a step in the right direction for WTO recognition of
legitimate regulatory measures. The WTO demonstrated its willingness to
be a forum for domestic concerns while promoting market access and a
reduction of trade barriers. More recently, WTO panels seem more
inclined to allow different treatment of "like products", provided the differ-
ent treatment is something less than less favorable treatment to the foreign
product. For example, in Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Impor-
tation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, the Appellate Body approved the
panel's conclusion that a bond requirement, levied on both domestic and
foreign cigarette producers for tax payment purposes, did not violate Arti-
cle 111:4, even though it imposed an "extra burden" on foreign importers
due to their smaller tax bracket.15 4 The Appellate Body focused on the
bond requirement's "detrimental effect" on foreign producers and con-
cluded that it was not enough of a burden to amount to less favorable treat-
ment.15 5 However, the Appellate Body did not define "detrimental effect"
or distinguish it from "less favorable treatment."'5 6 It reasoned that the
smaller market for foreign cigarettes effectively diminished the tax liability
of foreign producers, even though the bond requirement formally treated
both foreign and domestic producers identically.' 5 7 To avoid confusion,
the Appellate Body should have stated that, regardless of the disparate
effects of the bond requirement, the foreign and domestic cigarettes were
essentially "unlike" since the size of their market, which determines their
tax liability, was different. Instead, the Appellate Body seemingly narrowed
the application of Article 111:4 with respect to de facto or facially non-dis-
criminatory measures by finding that differential treatment did not amount
to treating foreign cigarette producers less favorably than domestic produc-
ers. 158 The Appellate Body, in implementing this "detrimental effect" stan-
dard, suggested that a legitimacy determination of the regulatory measure
is itself necessary. Unfortunately, this approach may further confuse the
application of Article III.
With respect to alleged national treatment violations, the WTO can
consider the legitimacy of domestic discriminatory measures that are
facially neutral and balance them against the burdens on free trade when
deciding the "likeness" of products.1 5 9 The WTO panels are not, however,
154. Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 132, IN 94-96.
155. Id. 96.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. The Appellate Body found that the products were "like;" however, despite une-
qual treatment in applying the bond requirement, the effects were not sufficiently detri-
mental to amount to a national treatment violation. See id.
159. See Howse & Tuerk, supra note 6, at 284 (stating that "[i]f the WTO is to regain
citizens' confidence, it has to prove its ability to balance the freedom of governments to
pursue legitimate domestic objectives with the need to secure the benefits of trade liber-
alization"); see also Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 620 (stating that "[tihe policing of
domestic regulatory measures is a delicate task, one that requires reaching an acceptable
balance between the trade objectives of the regime and the legitimate regulatory claims
of member states").
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in the best position to assess these issues as a matter of substantive law,
especially with respect to regulatory measures that use science as measure
for legitimacy. 160 Instead, the WTO panels can incorporate procedural
mechanisms that encourage deference to domestic regulatory structures,
which may be illuminating on questions of legitimacy.
D. Legitimate Domestic Regulation and National Treatment Violations-
The Slippery Slope
While enforcing its non-discrimination policies, the WTO panels still
recognize the need for regulatory measures to foster domestic economic
development. 16 ' They do not, however, establish criteria to distinguish
measures intended for domestic economic development from those that are
merely protectionist and, therefore, a national treatment violation. In a
1958 GATT Report entitled Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricul-
tural Machinery, the panel considered the Italian government's establish-
ment of a revolving credit fund, which granted special credit benefits for
the purchase of Italian agricultural machinery. 162 The fund was to exist
for a limited period of time in order to encourage the purchase of Italian
agricultural machinery; 163 however, this favorable credit scheme did not
exist for the purchase of foreign agricultural machinery. 164 The panel con-
sidered Italy's arguments that such a law existed to help develop the Italian
economy. 165 It concluded that the original intention of the GATT was not
"to limit the right of a contracting party to adopt measures which appeared
to it necessary to foster its economic development or to protect a domestic
industry, provided that such measures were permitted by the terms of the
General Agreement."'1 6 6 Though the panel found that the domestic objec-
tives could be achieved in ways more in line with Italy's commitments
under GATT, it distinguished between domestic measures passed solely to
protect domestic production and those that aimed to promote domestic
economic development. 16 7 It recognized that GATT does not prevent
domestic governments from passing laws that foster domestic economic
development.'16  The panel did not provide guidelines for distinguishing
160. See Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the
Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 326 (2002) (stating that science
"functions as a distinguishing criterion between legitimate and illegitimate trade barri-
ers in the form of national health regulation"). The author explores the use of the pre-
cautionary principle WTO assessments of legitimate regulatory measures. See generally
id.
161. Id. at 326.
162. Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, supra note 38.
163. Id. c1 2.
164. Id. The panel considered whether there was a violation of Article 111:4. Signifi-
cantly, however, this report did not reach the Final Determination Stage.
165. Id. 3.
166. Id. 16.
167. Id.
168. Id.
[Tihe extension of the credit facilities in question to the purchasers of imported
tractors as well as domestically produced tractors would detract from the attain-
ment of the objectives of the Law, which aimed at stimulating the purchase of
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between laws that foster domestic economic development from those that
are per se protectionist. In failing to draw these distinctions, the WTO can-
not clearly articulate the difference between a "permissible" regulatory
measure under GATT and one that amounts to protectionism.
The understanding that the WTO will not tolerate anticompetitive
practices by domestic governments or private entities is evident in its con-
demnation of measures that violate national treatment obligations.
Anticompetitive practices seemingly authorized by domestic governments
can nevertheless be difficult to assess, even at the domestic level. In Mex-
ico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, the WTO panel
attempted to deal with the definition of "anticompetitive practices" for the
first time.1 6 9 This interesting case concerned the telecommunications
industry in Mexico, which had been traditionally regulated prior to legisla-
tive efforts to open it to competition, much like in the U.S. telecommunica-
tions industry.170 The dispute between the U.S. and Mexico dealt with
Mexican laws that governed the supply of services in the context of tele-
communications, a market that continues to be "partially" regulated in
Mexico. 1 7 ' The U.S. claimed that interconnection rates charged by Mex-
ico's largest telecommunications service supplier, Telmex, failed to comply
with the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) and its Reference
Paper, which required "cost-oriented" and reasonable rate bases. 1 72 Also,
the U.S. claimed that the Mexican government failed to prevent Telmex
from engaging in anticompetitive behavior. 173 While finding Mexico in
violation of its commitments, the panel defined "anticompetitive practices"
on a broad basis. 17 4 It did not, however, deal with either the Mexican pol-
icy of regulating the telecommunications sector and allowing for market
dominance or the degree of regulation that would be construed as
"anticompetitive."' 7 5 Mexico attempted to show that the policies con-
strued as "anticompetitive" were actually procompetitive.17 6 Although this
case did not deal specifically with the issue of "like products," it did raise
issues surrounding "legitimate" regulatory policies designed to deregulate
tractors mainly by small farmers and co-operatives in the interests of economic
development. If, on the other hand, the objective of the Law, although not stated
in the text thereof, were to protect the Italian agricultural machinery industry,
the Panel considered that such protection should be given in ways permissible
under the General Agreement rather than by the extension of credit exclusively
for purchases of domestically produced agricultural machinery.
Id. Ultimately, the panel reached its determination based on the adverse effects of the
Italian law on imports of agricultural machinery according to Paragraph 2 of Article
XXIII rather than on a determination of an Article III violation. See id. 25.
169. See, e.g., Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, supra note 39.
170. Id. 9[ 2.2.
171. Id. 2.1.
172. Id. 3.1(a).
173. Id. c1 3.1(b).
174. Id. 'H 7.222-269 (defining "anticompetitive practices" as "actions that lessen
rivalry or competition in the market").
175. Id. 1 7.235-237.
176. Id. 7.223.
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sectors where a natural monopoly existed, and the ability of WTO panels
properly to adjudicate such policies at the supranational level.
II. Finding Answers in WTO Member States
A. The U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause Analogy
Under the current WTO interpretation of Article III, the focus is not
on legitimate regulatory policy but on the products themselves, and
whether or not they are "like" according to the criteria set out by the WTO
panels. Once a panel determines that a "likeness" between products is
demonstrated, and the regulatory measure treats one differently from the
other, it is very difficult for a respondent to prove that there is no intent "to
afford protection to domestic production." In other words, after 1996Japan
Alcoholic Beverages, a WTO panel will treat measures that are facially dis-
criminatory (de jure) and neutral measures with discriminatory effects (de
facto) in the same manner. 177 If discriminatory, either kind of measures
will violate Article III of GATT. 178
In this way, U.S. law may aid WTO panels in their application of Arti-
cle III. Under U.S. law, legal principles governing the application of the
dormant Commerce Clause account for state measures that regulate in
facially non-discriminatory ways to achieve a legitimate local purpose.17 9
Also, the U.S. Supreme Court will invalidate state laws that are facially
discriminatory towards other states' products. 180 The presumption that a
facially discriminatory state measure is unconstitutional can be rebutted
by showing that it furthers some other legitimate non-economic state inter-
est or is necessary and no alternative means are available.' 8 ' Where a
state measure is facially neutral, the Court examines its purpose and
177. 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 100, '1 6.17-6.19.
178. Id. at 11 6.21-6.23.
179. Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1413.
180. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617 (1978); C&A Carbon, Inc v.
Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994). Note that with facially discriminatory measures,
the presumption is that the state measure is unconstitutional. See e.g., Lewis v. BT
Investments Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that
prevented out-of-state banks from owning investment advisory businesses within the
state); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
181. Such policy is permissible if it is an instrument of state police power. See gener-
ally Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34 (1927); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245
(1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824). See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131, 138 (1986) (citing Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). For further exam-
ples, see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982); Hunt v.
Wash. St. Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). Although the Court usually discusses the need for
a "legitimate" local purpose in the context of highly deferential rational basis review, in
several of the dormant commerce clause cases the Court states that the justification for
discrimination against interstate commerce must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141. These cases strongly suggest that the Court must find that the
state has at the very least an important or possibly a compelling reason for discrimina-
tion before it will uphold a statute or regulation.
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effects, very much like the "aim and effects" test under US-Malt Bever-
ages. 18 2 Unlike the WTO, however, U.S. case law distinguishes between
measures that have a discriminatory effect on outsiders and those that are
implemented even-handedly but create "incidental burdens" on interstate
commerce. 18 3 In the former scenario, a state may rebut the presumption
of a commerce clause violation if it demonstrates a legitimate state interest,
and that the measure is necessary to further that interest. 18 4 With the lat-
ter cases, the Court incorporates a balancing test weighing the local bene-
fits of implementing such a measure against the costs to interstate
commerce. 185 In this way, the Court addresses those measures that have
an "incidental" or "indirect" burden on interstate commerce but do not
entail an obvious protectionist purpose. 1 8 6 In applying the balancing test,
the Court must first find a legitimate state purpose advanced by the
measure. 187
Whereas U.S. law considers several factors dealing with discrimina-
tory intent to give a competitive advantage to local producers, GATT law
focuses on the likeness of the products, including their substitutability,
irrespective of whether there is a local production producing the same
products. 188 In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, although a
legitimate state interest is not presumed and the tendency is to favor "free
trade" among the states, the U.S. Supreme Court does not ignore the possi-
ble existence of a legitimate state interest. 189 Rather, it attempts to balance
182. Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1412.
183. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333, 354 (1977) (rejecting a state law requiring state-approved labels as creating dis-
criminatory effects that could have been avoided with other nondiscriminatory mea-
sures). But see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
184. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138. The state may also demonstrate that the measure is an
instrument of the state's general police power. Id.
185. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). See also Farber & Hudec,
supra note 11, at 1413 (distinguishing between the burden of proving no alternative
nondiscriminatory measures for cases involving discriminatory effects and the balanc-
ing test applied in cases involving measures with only "incidental burdens on interstate
commerce"); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
186. Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1413.
187. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (stating that a "statute [that] regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits").
188. Factors U.S. courts consider in deciding the legality of facially neutral regula-
tions include:
1. the existence of a discriminatory intent to economically advantage local
business;
2. the measure, while facially neutral, consists of a "proxy characteristic" that
will advantage local business at the expense of outsiders;
3. the measure has the effect of embargoing outside products;
4. the measure provides a competitive advantage to local products over the same
outside products; and
5. the measure may lack uniformity and consistency in its application, burden-
ing outside products.
See Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1416-17.
189. Id. at 1412-13.
Vol. 40
2007 Mission Possible
the interests of interstate commerce with those of intrastate commerce. ' 90
In dealing with these "incidental burdens," the Court seems to presume a
non-protectionist intent. 191 Furthermore, in the context of dormant Com-
merce Clause, the Court makes an exception when the state participates in
the market. 1
9 2
In the dormant Commerce Clause context, U.S. federal courts avoid
focusing on protectionist intent and tend to prefer a balancing approach
approving of measures that are facially neutral and create only "incidental
burdens" on interstate commerce. This approach, of course, places more
responsibility on federal judges in deciding whether regulatory benefits are
sufficient to justify burdens on outside states. 193 On the other hand, in
applying Article III, the WTO panels stray so far in the direction of free
trade that they ignore the possibility of a legitimate domestic regulatory
policy that (1) though discriminatory, places only "incidental burdens" on
free trade; and (2) arises from domestic industries traditionally regulated
or "partially" regulated. Furthermore, the "like products" test of Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages does not consider the possibility of an even-handed reg-
ulation having protectionist effects but intended to further a domestic pur-
pose that is legitimate and non-protectionist.'
9 4
The fact that U.S. and GATT law handle regulatory measures in simi-
lar but distinct ways invites us to consider whether they address different
sets of concerns. Legal doctrines dealing with the dormant Commerce
Clause are arguably concerned with the preservation of a "political union."
In other words, regulatory measures that amount to state protectionism are
hostile to preserving the larger interests of a centralized government and
190. Id. at 1413.
191. See id. (stating that the difference in treatment of measures with discriminatory
effects and those with only incidental burdens "suggests an absence of protectionist
purpose").
192. This is referred to as the "market participant exception." See Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). See also Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market
Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 399-406
(1989) (discussing the development of the market-participant rule).
193. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1414-17; see also Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 MicH. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (1986) (arguing for a judicial approach that stresses a
finding of protectionist intent rather than a balancing test, especially in the context of
movement of goods cases).
194. EC-Asbestos may be a step in this direction. See supra Part I.C. For example, in
the context of the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause, America Can. Co. v. Oregon Liquor
Control Commission, 517 P.2d 691 (1973), involved an Oregon law intended to protect
the environment by discouraging the use of non-returnable, non-reusable beverage con-
tainers by placing a refundable deposit on the containers. The deposit was repayable to
consumers and retailers upon the return of the container. The effect of the statute was
to encourage use of glass bottles instead of metal cans. This would increase transporta-
tion costs (because glass is heavier than cans), which tended to favor Oregon bottlers
over out of state bottlers. The Appellate Court found no protectionist purpose and the
statute was upheld. See generally id.
229
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therefore should be eliminated. 195 The U.S. Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce through the Commerce Clause.
19 6
The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially created inversion of the
commerce power, recognizing state power to regulate intrastate commerce
as long as it does not interfere with Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state commerce. 19 7 However, the idea behind tempering state power in
this way is the preservation of Congress' ultimate authority to regulate
interstate commerce, which, in turn, is of interest to all the states as part of
a federalist system. 198
The GATT and the more modern WTO do not claim to have such regu-
latory power over global commerce. Instead, the WTO adjudicates the
trade arrangements of its member states and guarantees a multilateral
framework that will facilitate free trade and encourage economic interde-
pendence. 199 Many will argue that this multilateral regime is in fact a fed-
eralist system or, at minimum, the GATT principles are a form of
constitutional law.20 0 Whether the WTO is viewed as a lawmaking institu-
tion or just the guarantor of globally accepted trade principles, the WTO
panels undeniably adjudicate to preserve a multilateral trade regime cre-
ated and accepted by its members, and to facilitate free trade among mem-
ber states. 20 1 It is arguable if this is also enforcement of any one law.
Despite this fundamental difference in the two systems, they can still learn
from one another while implementing the principles in ways more aligned
with the institutions they are trying to preserve.
What can the WTO panels learn from the debate surrounding the dor-
mant Commerce Clause? Perhaps the most important lessons are found
where regimes deal with similar sets of concerns. 20 2 In both regimes, the
195. See Regan, supra note 193, at 1112-13 (discussing the "concept-of-union" objec-
tion to state protectionism).
196. U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Id.
197. Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L.
REv. 1215, 1215 (1994). But see generally, Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congres-
sional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. LAw REv. 1764 (2004)
(arguing that the power to overturn the dormant Commerce Clause rests in the legisla-
tive branch and that Congress's silence on the issue is significant).
198. See Jim Chen, supra note 197, at 1796 (stating that "the shameless judicial for-
mulas as that comprise the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine continue to uphold the
core federal interest in a nationwide common market").
199. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1405-06 (stating that the "postwar initia-
tive that created GATT also rested on a collective perception that ruthless treatment of
the economic interests of outsiders is inconsistent with the conditions of peaceful inter-
national society").
200. See id. at 1404.
201. See infra Part II.B.
202. Farber & Hudec, supra note 11, at 1403 (stating that the GATT and the dormant
Commerce Clause share common concerns). The authors argue,
The modern regulatory state inevitably produces burdens on trade, if only
because of the unavoidable lack of regulatory uniformity. For various reasons,
many of these burdens likely are unwarranted, and at least some are in fact due
to protectionist efforts by local industries. Yet, tribunals have only a limited
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challenge is not the facially discriminatory regulatory measure, but the
"indirect" regulatory, or the facially neutral, measure that affects or disad-
vantages outside competition.20 3 Where the WTO may learn the most
from the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is in the questions
asked in deciding which domestic regulatory measures are protectionist
enough to be in violation of Article Ill. In addition, it is important for the
WTO to recognize that sovereign nations are in the best position to regulate
domestically and to address social objectives, even if they employ the least
efficient means of achieving those goals.20 4 The WTO must also ensure,
however, that domestic measures-even those with legitimate objectives-
do not hamper the goals of free trade. A first step in achieving some bal-
ance between the two sets of interests is in recognizing that some regula-
tory measures have legitimate domestic goals that affect the
competitiveness of outsiders in only "incidental ways." Furthermore, when
ruling on those measures with clear discriminatory effects, the WTO
should consider whether the measure offers any alternative means of
achieving the same objective. Perhaps this is where the WTO should begin
its distinctions and weave them into the "like products" test rather than
within the stricter Article XX.
Article XX creates an exemption for domestic regulatory measures that
would otherwise be a GATT violation but are justified because they deal
with the protection of health and safety, exhaustible resources, public
morals, and other areas.20 5 GATT panels have struggled to reconcile Arti-
cle XX with Article Ill, especially with measures that are facially neutral but
have discriminatory effects.20 6 Some of this conflict has been based on the
language of GATT. Article XX states that some measures are justifiable as
long as they are not applied arbitrarily or in unjustifiably discriminatory
ways, and if they do not amount to "disguised restrictions on international
trade." 20 7 Presumably, all violations of Article III, however, are "disguised
restrictions on international trade"; therefore, it seems difficult to find any
justification under Article XX. Finding compliance under Article III does
not render Article XX inoperative. 20 8 Notably, however, Article XX is very
limited in scope and places the burden on the respondent to prove that the
given regulatory measure is the least restrictive, and that no alternative
warrant to override the policy choices of local legislatures. Tribunals must
accord respect to the democratic process as well as to the prerogatives (or sover-
eignty) of local governments.
See id.
203. See id. (stating that "GATT agreements also contain a number of DCC-like pre-
scriptions, prohibiting national regulatory measures that constitute 'unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade' or a 'disguised restriction on international trade"').
204. See id. at 1404 (stating that in the context of the dormant commerce clause, "we
accord legislatures the freedom to choose economically harmful results, including the
freedom to choose the least efficient way to accomplish a particular social objective").
205. GATT, supra note 1, art. xx.
206. Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 620, 626-29.
207. Id.; see also GATT, supra note 1, art. xx.
208. See supra Part L.C for discussion on EC-Asbestos and showing that EC-Asbestos
case settled the issue somewhat.
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exists.20 9 The "necessity" requirement in Article XX is confined to regula-
tory measures that are inherently compelling. 2 10  For these reasons,
respondents should have the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of the
given regulatory measure in the context of Article III rather than under
Article XX, which presumes a national treatment violation.
In making determinations regarding the legitimacy of a regulatory
measure, WTO panels should look to transparent domestic regulatory
structures for answers. More specifically, they should require those institu-
tions closest to the measure, namely the legislatures, to answer to the WTO
regarding the need for such a measure while remaining committed to their
obligations under GATT. To some extent, the Chapter 11 tribunals under
NAFTA are already dealing with regulatory measures in this way. However,
in deciding more normative issues such as the meaning of "like" for pur-
poses of national treatment, NAFTA tribunals tend to defer to WTO
decisions.
2 1 1
B. The Regulatory Model versus the Antidiscrimination Model
The creators of the GATT system did not intend to create an interna-
tional institution that would replace domestic governance; however, they
did want to discourage member states from engaging in protectionist activi-
ties. 2 12 The founders intended to create a multilateral trade regime that
would promote peace through economic interdependence and sustainable
development. 2 13 What is unclear is if they intended to follow a regulatory
model approach by establishing an international agency that would take
an autocratic stance on issues of free trade law, or if they envisioned a fluid
system that would set standards but ultimately let the member states exe-
cute and incorporate these standards into their national systems, an
approach much more in line with the antidiscrimination model. 2 14 Assess-
ing the intent of the original founders is perhaps less important than estab-
lishing a realistic framework through which WTO panels may best deal
with domestic regulatory measures. One approach is the "regulatory
209. Hudec, Requiem, supra note 68, at 621-22.
210. Most of the cases involving decisions on Article XX have dealt with dejure dis-
criminatory measures. See id. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 373-585 (1993) (providing a list of GATT legal complaints from 1948-
1989).
211. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA
AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM
107-108 (1995).
212. See Sutherland Report, supra note 95, at 11 (stating that in reaping the benefits
of free trade, "[m]uch remains in the hands of individual governments"); see also id. at
29-34 (discussing issues of sovereignty and free trade).
213. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 21 (2000) (stating that the goals behind the GATT
agreement included "the prevention of war and the establishment of a just system of
economic relations" as well as "the economic benefits that might derive from interna-
tional trade and economic stability") [hereinafter JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT]; see
also Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, pmbl.
214. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 590-96.
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model", which portrays the WTO as a regulatory commission that proposes
universal standards for regulatory measures dealing with issues of labor,
environment, health, and safety. 2 15 One of the problems with this model is
its vulnerability to special interest capture. 2 16 Under this approach, the
WTO panels adjudicate according to their own universal standards. 2 17 At
some level, the WTO does this by addressing issues that only come under
the Covered Agreements.2 18 Even in embracing those universal standards,
however, the WTO ultimately relies on domestic laws and local democratic
frameworks in its application and enforcement of those standards.2 19 The
present regulatory model fails to take into account that in dealing with
domestic measures, the WTO must work with domestic regulatory struc-
tures by permeating them with a web-like network of influence to ensure
compliance with GATT agreements.
John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, who advocate an antidis-
crimination model for the WTO rather than a regulatory model, discuss a
procedural mechanism within the larger context of developing a "jurispru-
dence of covert protectionism.122 0 They set up a legal and procedural
framework using an antidiscrimination model of the WTO, whereby WTO
panels may more clearly assess "covert protectionism" at the domestic
level. 2 2 1 However, the jurisprudence they develop applies primarily to reg-
ulatory measures in the areas of labor, the environment, health and
safety.22 2 The authors also propose "determinate rules," based on the
requirements of transparency, 22 3 performance orientation, and consis-
tency, to distinguish legitimate regulations by member states from illegiti-
mate ones.2 24 They also rely, however, on an "objective evidence
requirement" for member states seeking to prove the legitimacy of such
measures. 2 25 Such objective evidence would be loosely based on scientific
215. Id. at 566 (describing the WTO's adjudication of national regulations as one
following an "antidiscrimination model" and describing the difficulties in the regulatory
model). The authors describe the "antidiscrimination model" as one which can promote
the development of democratic and transparent regulatory frameworks. See id. at
566-72.
216. Id. at 556-58.
217. Id. at 550-51.
218. Id. at 530-31.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 572. The authors define "covert protectionism" as having have two main
characteristics: 1) "the measure must be one that would not have been enacted but for
the benefits it gives domestic industries by restraining imports; 2) the measure must
lack a public interest foundation." Id. The authors do not clearly define measures with
a "public interest foundation" but seem to presume it if in fact the determinate rules are
met. See id. at 572-73 (stating that the "second criterion may be subsumed as a practi-
cal matter by the first").
221. Id. at 572-73.
222. Id. at 572.
223. Professors McGinnis and Movsesian emphasize that transparency is one of the
key principles necessary for building true democratic institutions. See id. at 574 (also
stating that "[tiransparency levels the playing field by ensuring that regulations are pub-
licized and the steps for compliance are clear").
224. Id. at 568, 573-76.
225. Id. at 577-78.
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studies. 22 6 This approach, while helpful for measures whose risk assess-
ments can be achieved through scientific studies, may fail to assess other
legitimate reasons for regulations which science cannot measure, such as
public choice or economic development. They recognize that even mea-
sures meeting the three requirements may nevertheless create an inference
of covert protectionism. 2 27 For these instances, the authors outline a "pro-
cedure-oriented approach" that uses "objective evidence" based on scien-
tific risk assessments to determine a measure's legitimacy. 228 It is here
where they embrace a deferential approach to national risk assessment
mechanisms as well as a "least restrictive means test."'2 29
C. Deference to the Transparent Regulatory Structures of Member
States
The GATT was only one part of a larger, faulty engine, the Interna-
tional Trade Organization (ITO), 2 30 which was designed to administer the
GATT.2 3 1 Against the backdrop of a devastated post-war Europe, the Bret-
ton Woods system, the framework within which the ITO, the GATT, and
other bodies would function, was originally intended to propel global eco-
nomic integration and development. 232 The ITO failed to materialize, how-
ever, leaving the GATT as the ill-equipped, main international trade
agreement. 23 3 The WTO was therefore formed as an institutional remedy
for the failures of the ITO.2 34
Unlike most modern federalist systems, the WTO does not obtain its
authority through general principles of sovereignty. 235 Rather, it gathers
its powers from the willingness of member states to participate in the
global process; thus, the WTO has the role of adjudicator and facilitator
rather than agent, of a sovereign entity.23 6 In this role, WTO panels must
balance the domestic interests of its member states with the interests of the
226. Id.
227. Id. at 576.
228. See id. at 577-78.
229. Id. at 579.
230. See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the GATT as the wheel of a larger
machine that was the International Trade Organization).
231. See id. at 43.
232. See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 351-52 (1995); see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE
GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 10-16 (1970); JACKSON, supra
note 25, at 35-57 (providing a detailed history of the GATT agreement).
233. See Dillon, supra note 232, at 352-55.
234. See id. at 355.
235. See JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT, supra note 213, at 134; see also Robert E.
Hudec, Comment by Robert E. Hudec, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTI-
LATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 297 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (stating
that the WTO may be viewed as "a freestanding institution" as well as "an ingredient of
the domestic decision-making process of national governments") [hereinafter Hudec
Comment].
236. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 213, art.
III (providing that the WTO "shall facilitate the implementation, administration and
operation, and further the objectives" of the WTO and "shall provide the forum for nego-
tiations" among member states).
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global community. 23 7 In doing so, WTO panels must enforce the eco-
nomic goals of the global community while also preserving non-economic
objectives of the WTO, including development, peace, transparency, and
just distribution of economic assets through economic interdependence
and multilateralism. 238 Ultimately, given that the WTO can only work
within the parameters of its Covered Agreements, the WTO has trouble
addressing these multilateral goals alone. 239 For issues not addressed by
these agreements, the WTO system must also rely on its member states to
promote these multilateral goals at the domestic level.
Rather than distort the balance of the multilateral trade regime with
strict formalism and broad interpretations of disguised trade restrictions,
the WTO panels can become a forum for discussion of legitimate regula-
tory measures by adopting a contextualist approach in its adjudication of
those measures.2 40 In its current strict formalism, the WTO arguably
empowers itself with "constitutional" authority, setting legal norms for a
network of governmental participants that have not necessarily delegated
such authority to this international institution.24' This is not to say that
the beginnings of such a constitutional framework have not been set; how-
ever, this is a separate, albeit related, question. In entering into GATT and
later acquiescing to the panel decisions of the WTO, member states did not
delegate to the WTO absolute authority to rule and decide normative ques-
tions regarding free trade.24 2 Most of the sovereign member states already
have administrative processes to manage trade issues, and many have
entered into their own regional and bilateral trade agreements. 2 43 Member
states do, however, look to the WTO both for political support to criticize
restrictive trade measures of their counterparts and for affirmative rulings
237. See Rufus H. Yerxa, Comment by Rufus H. Yerxa, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGIT-
IMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 381, 382 (Roger B. Porter
et al. eds., 2001).
238. See JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT, supra note 213, at 155 (describing mem-
bers of WTO panels as "delegates" of member states, entrusted with authority "to vindi-
cate the political decisions made by the members as a whole"); see also Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 213, pmbl.
239. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 250-51.
240. See id. at 250.
241. See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 227 (Roger B. Porter et al., 2001) (dis-
tinguishing between the GATT as a forum for bargaining among its self-interested mem-
ber states and the later WTO, which can be viewed as "performing constitutional
functions or to be an incipient global economic constitution").
242. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 250 (describing the "fundamental purpose" of
the original GATT dispute settlement system as "facilitat[ing] the diplomatic settlement
of trade disputes between contracting parties"). The author goes on to describe the cur-
rent WTO system as one "far more legalized and fundamentally adjudicative." Id. at
250-51. But see JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT, supra note 213, at 155 (describing
members of WTO panels as "delegates" of member states, entrusted with authority "to
vindicate the political decisions made by the members as a whole").
243. Examples of such regional and bilateral trade agreements include the U.S. Tariff
Act of 1974; the European Union; Mexico's SECOFI; and Canada's Court of Interna-
tional Trade.
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on those policies.24 4 In this way, the WTO is as much an internal player in
domestic trade and regulatory policy-making as it is an external adjudica-
tor.2 45 Inherent in facilitating free trade, however, is enabling member
states to make and regulate domestic decisions for their constituents.
The institutions closest to the execution of the domestic regulatory
measure are in the best position to judge the legitimacy of regulatory mea-
sures as a matter of domestic law. At the same time, those very institutions
may also be most interested in furthering those measures for reasons other
than acceptable public purposes. 246 Therefore, objective criteria should
drive domestic institutions' implementation of regulatory measures.
Although scientific risk assessment for measures dealing with health,
safety, or the environment creates an objective framework within which the
"need" for such measures can be assessed,2 47 science is often inconclusive.
Therefore, other public assessments of risk involving the democratic, delib-
erative process are also important in establishing such measures. 2 48 Ques-
tions of legitimacy are complicated even further when international
tribunals must judge regulatory measures as a matter of international law
or, in the case of the WTO, GATT law. 249 For example, the Appellate Body
in EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), found that
European bans on U.S. beef imports on grounds that national regulations
prevented hormone use in beef was in violation of the SPS Agreement
because the European Community failed to base its measure on a scientific
risk assessment. 250 The Appellate Body did not, however, go so far as to
find the hormone ban to be a disguised trade restriction.25 1 Because of
244. See generally Kent Jones, Contrary Opinion: Who's Afraid of the WTO?, 41 CHAL-
LENGE 105, 105-19 (1998) (deconstructing anxieties accompanying the reality of eco-
nomic integration among world countries).
245. See U.S. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §1677 (1974) (referring to the WTO). See Hudec
Comment, supra note 235, at 297 (stating that the WTO may be viewed as "a freestand-
ing institution" as well as "an ingredient of the domestic decision-making process of
national governments").
246. See David Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAw 7, 9-10 (1995) (stating that U.S. trade
law results from a political process that includes various special interests).
247. See Bohanes, supra note 160, at 346 (stating that "science is clearly linked to the
notion of standards of review in the adjudicative setting").
248. Id. at 356 (discussing differences between "scientific risk assessment and public
perceptions of risk"). Specifically, the author explains that public assessments of risk
made through a legitimate democratic process should be respected despite the risk of
inconsistency with scientific conclusions. See id. at 356-62.
249. See generally Deborah Cass, The "Constitutionalizaton" of International Trade
Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in Interna-
tional Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39, 53-57 (2001) (arguing that the case law of the WTO
Appellate Body reflects a gradual "constitutionalization" analogous to adjudication
under international law).
250. GATT Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), GATT Doc. WT/DS26/AB/USA [ 124-25 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Appellate Body-Beef Hormones].
251. Bohanes, supra note 160, at 354 (emphasizing that there was not a finding of a
disguised trade restriction but rather that "the EC ban was simply bad lawmaking
because the results of the scientific risk assessments did not sufficiently and reasonably
warrant the European ban").
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domestic political processes and the interest groups at play, an interna-
tional trade standard that is too lenient in upholding regulatory measures
may in fact further protectionist measures that become disguised trade
restrictions. 2 52 Furthermore, certain special interest groups at a domestic
level may also aid in eliminating protectionist measures by lobbying
against those interest groups that espouse protectionist measures. 2 5 3 This
"Darwinian strategy" assumes that the export interest groups are the
strongest groups and will eventually defeat those groups pushing for pro-
tectionist measures. It is unclear whether such a battle maximizes con-
sumer welfare. The question of who should determine the legitimacy of a
regulatory measure is an important one and is beyond the scope of this
paper. Member states are understandably reluctant to delegate too much
authority to an international institution such as the WTO in dealing with
domestic issues. 25 4 Suffice it to say, however, the WTO panels do not have
the resources to investigate the domestic intent of regulatory measures or
their legitimacy. 25 5 They can only assess these questions substantively
according to the Covered Agreements. 25 6
Therefore, it is within domestic regulatory processes that protectionist
measures may best be curtailed. It is also within domestic governmental
structures that local needs and interests may be determined. As explained
in the Sutherland Report, the WTO "sets some strict disciplines under
which governments may choose to respond to special interests. ' '2 57 The
WTO provides a framework within which trade liberalization and eco-
nomic interdependence may flourish, and it helps to shape internal policy.
In addition, compliance under regional agreements adds another level to
this multilateral framework. Regional tribunals tend to look to WTO juris-
prudence in applying provisions under these agreements. 25 8 Coordination
under these circumstances is a further challenge, and it is important that
the WTO panels recognize these factors when adjudicating regulatory mea-
sures. To do so, the panels can defer as a matter of procedure to the
domestic institutions closest to the measures at hand in assessing issues of
legitimacy. Some may ask if a strategy that encourages deference to
domestic institutions just incites institutions to pass protectionist measures
252. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Essay, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest
Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the retaliation remedy of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, in which a prevailing party before the WTO Appel-
late Body can suspend trade concessions that it owes to the losing party, is necessary to
counter the influence of domestic interest group upon trade regulations).
253. See id. at 4 (explaining that a retaliation remedy can "create incentives for
another set of domestic interest group-exporters- . . . that favor free trade [and] can
neutralize the effect of the domestic groups that oppose it").
254. 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 100, EEC pleadings.
255. See JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT, supra note 213, at 115-17 (describing
GATT dispute resolution as having "meager resources" to deal with many questions of
domestic policy accurately).
256. DSU, supra note 2, art. 1.1 (stipulating that the cause of action of WTO dispute
mist be found in the covered agreements).
257. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 95, at 15.
258. See infra Part Ill (explaining how NAFTA tribunals tend to defer to WTO deci-
sions when applicable).
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under the guise of legitimate and transparent democratic processes. In
other words, are we not putting the fox in the henhouse? 25 9 While there is
concern for protectionist capture at the local level, the regulatory model
does not necessarily eliminate it.2 60 Furthermore, special interest groups
at the domestic level will battle against each other, and the democratic pro-
cess will ultimately decide how best to comply with free trade commit-
ments. 26 1 A regulatory model may run the risk of capture as well,
particularly if it does not encourage fluidity and change. One must remain
realistic about the extent of WTO enforcement of its decisions. The WTO's
ability to influence the behavior of its member states rests primarily in its
ability to authorize members to retaliate against other members not in com-
pliance with GATT agreements. 26 2 Furthermore, the WTO may shape pub-
lic perception of a nation's willingness to remain committed to the
international regime as a whole.2 63 Ultimately, however, the WTO relies
on its member states to enforce its decisions. 26 4 Too much retaliatory
behavior by member states leads to isolationism, which is exactly what the
GATT was intended to prevent. 2 65 The reciprocal deference approach I pro-
pose is just one piece of the larger puzzle of cohesiveness and coordination
between WTO adjudicatory power and domestic implementation of WTO
policies. It is not the final solution, but it provides a procedural safeguard
for WTO adjudication of internal regulatory measures. For example, if the
panel finds that as a matter of GATT law the measure in question is facially
neutral yet has some protectionist effects on trade, the panel should ask the
legislature to demonstrate the necessity of the measure. It will then be up
to the WTO panel to make a final determination as to compliance with
GATT and the Covered Agreements.
III. Lessons for National Treatment from the NAFTA Chapter 11
Tribunals
Through Article XXIV of GATT, the WTO system permits the forma-
tion of regional integration agreements that may incorporate their own dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. 2 66 Whereas WTO panels do not defer to
regional tribunals or domestic court decisions in adjudicating the GATT
provisions, NAFTA tribunals do tend to defer to WTO decisions when
259. Many thanks to Frank Garcia for his comments in this respect.
260. See Sykes, supra note 54, at 4.
261. See Movsesian, supra note 252, at 4 (discussing the positive effects on free trade
that interest groups may have at the domestic level).
262. See Arvind Subramanian & Jayshree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement
Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 403, 406 (2000).
263. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analy-
sis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J. 901-04 (1995).
264. See id. at 895-901.
265. See Peter M. Gerhart, The World Trade Organization and Participatory Democracy,
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 897, 908 (2004).
266. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA
AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 41
(NAFTA Law and Policy Series eds., 1995).
Vol. 40
2007 Mission Possible
applicable. 26 7 More specifically, the signatories of NAFTA ("Parties") reaf-
firmed their rights and obligations under GATT. 268 Article 102 states that
the Parties "shall interpret and apply" the NAFTA treaty provisions "in
accordance with applicable rules of international law."'269  Moreover,
national treatment obligations for market access under NAFTA are specifi-
cally in accordance with Article III of GATT. 2 70 As under the GATT, how-
ever, the notion of "like circumstances" is applied in various contexts
throughout NAFTA, and NAFTA tribunals struggle to understand its
meaning. 27 1
A. Deference and "Like Circumstances" under Chapter 11 of NAFTA
In dealing with national treatment issues for foreign investments,
Chapter 11 NAFTA tribunals apply the operative phrase "like circum-
stances" to determine national treatment violations under Article 1102.272
Article 1102 states that NAFTA Parties must treat the investments of other
Parties in a manner
no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, expansion, management, conduct, opera-
tion, and sale or other disposition of investments.
2 73
Defining what exactly constitutes "in like circumstances" is the chal-
lenge, for the NAFTA treaty never explicitly defines this phrase. Prior
NAFTA cases have dealt with the issue and for the most part have chosen to
look to "like products" under Article III of GATT for answers. 2 74 It is, nev-
ertheless, important to remember that, while Chapter 11 arbitration panels
do establish binding determinations with enforceable awards, just as the
WTO, they are not bound by stare decisis.275 Therefore, each panel decides
every case on its own merits and on an individual basis according to all of
the surrounding circumstances.
By allowing investors to sue party-governments, thereby safeguarding
foreign investment, NAFTA marked a major development in international
267. See id. at 107-108.
268. See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 103.
269. Id. art. 102, § 2.
270. See id. art. 30; see also Gantz, supra note 246, at 15-16.
271. See e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Merits, Phase Two, 11 73-104
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/AwardMerits-e.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits].
272. NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1102.
273. Id. (emphasis added). Article 1102 also protects "investments of investors of
another Party" in the same way. Id.
274. NAFTA tribunals also look to OECD agreements where the term "like situations"
is defined. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 55, 91 245-46; Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Canada, Interim Award, 78 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2000), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc7.pdf [hereinafter Pope &
Talbot, Interim Award].
275. See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1136(1) (providing that arbitral awards are bind-
ing only on the parties and only in respect to the particular case).
Cornell International Law Journal
investment law.2 76 Pushed by their concern about the threat of govern-
ment expropriation or nationalization of their investments, the parties
were quite thorough in drafting Chapter 11 with specific provisions for
damages and arbitration of disputes under international arbitration rules
of ICSID or UNCITRAL. 2 77 The drafters likely never imagined, however,
that litigants would question regulatory measures with such vigor as under
Chapter 11 investor disputes. Despite their deference to Article III of
GATT, the tribunals have also established some interesting ways of dealing
with domestic regulatory measures. 2 78 A more detailed examination of the
Chapter 11 decisions will reveal similarities and differences with compara-
ble decisions by the WTO panels under Article III.
B. A Closer Look at Article 1102
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the U.S. investor S.D. Myers, an Ohio
corporation that treated Canadian PCB waste in its U.S. facility through
Myers Canada, brought a Chapter 11 action against Canada, challenging
Canada's prohibition on polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) exports. 27 9
Among other allegations, S.D. Myers claimed that the Canadian export
restrictions violated national treatment provisions of Art. 1102.280 The
claimant asserted that the export ban effectively barred it from competing
for PCB waste disposal business in Canada, while not similarly restraining
Canadian companies, which had access to processing facilities located in
Canada. 28 ' The tribunal agreed with the investor. 28 2 In making this deter-
mination, however, it looked to the intent of the Canadian export restric-
tions to determine whether it was protectionist. 2 83 After reviewing records
from the Canadian Ministry of the Environment at both the federal and
provincial levels, the tribunal found that the intent of the export ban was to
bar the export of PCBs to the U.S. "to protect the Canadian PCB disposal
industry from U.S. competition. ' 28 4 The tribunal recognized that there
could have been an "indirect environmental objective," but it held that
there were alternative means of reaching these objectives more in line with
276. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, 1II, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment
Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE
AMERICAS 165, 165 (Judith H. Bello, Alan F. Holmer, & Joseph J. Norton eds., 1994).
277. See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1120 (allowing investors to submit a claim to
arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration rules).
278. See generally Surya P. Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Princi-
ples within the Law of Foreign Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the
Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation", 49 INT'L LAw. 121 (2006).
279. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 274. These restrictions were in accordance
with Canadian commitments under the Basel Convention.
280. id. 310.
281. Id. 1 131.
282. Id. 255-56.
283. Id. cj 252.
284. Id. cj 194.
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the objectives of NAFTA. 28 5
With respect to the issue of national treatment under Article 1102 of
NAFTA, the tribunal deferred to the WTO's analysis of Article III under the
decision Japan Alcoholic Beverages decision.28 6 The tribunal stated that a
finding of "like" under GATT did not necessarily invalidate the measure;
instead, it would just "set the stage for an inquiry into whether the different
treatment of situations found to be 'like' [was] justified by legitimate public
policy measures that [were] pursued in a reasonable manner. '28 7 The tri-
bunal also looked to the OECD practices in dealing with foreign invest-
ments in "like situations. '2 88 The tribunal considered the larger objectives
of NAFTA, which included the Environmental Side Agreement that
expressed the parties' concerns for the environment as well as the elimina-
tion of trade barriers among the three countries. 28 9 The tribunal stated:
The assessment of "like circumstances" must also take into account circum-
stances that would justify governmental regulations that treat them differ-
ently in order to protect the public interest." The concept of "like
circumstances" invites an examination of whether a non-national investor
complaining of less favorable treatment is in the same "sector" as the
national investor. 290
In comparing this interpretation of "like circumstances" to the WTO
panels' interpretation of "like products," the NAFTA tribunal appears to be
much more willing than the WTO to understand "likeness" as falling
within certain categories, which may or may not include certain regulatory
measures. 29 1 This type of interpretation is reminiscent of the "aims and
effects" test and closer to the EC-Asbestos application of Article III than the
narrower test in Japan Alcoholic Beverages.
The tribunal in S.D. Myers stated that the determination of whether
there was a national treatment violation under Chapter 11 of NAFTA
turned on two factors: (1) whether the measure has the effect of discrimi-
nating on the basis of nationality; and (2) whether the measure is facially
discriminatory along the same lines. 2 9 2 This broad sweep on domestic reg-
285. Id. ' 195. The Tribunal noted that the "indirect environmental objective" was "to
keep the Canadian industry strong in order to assure a continued disposal capability."
Id.
286. Id. c9 243-44.
287. Id. 246. Much like the WTO panels, the NAFTA Tribunal failed to recognize
the difference in an Article XX justification for regulatory measures that for all other
purposes was a violation of Article III, and the possibility that under the auspices of
Article Ill, the measure may not necessarily be a violation at all.
288. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 279, ' 248. OECD does consider the rele-
vant domestic policy objectives in its determination of whether the investments are in
"like circumstances." See id. '11 248, 250. Note that the tribunal took an expansive view
of "sector." Id.
289. Id. 1 250.
290. Id.
291. But see generally EC-Asbestos, supra note 27.
292. S.D. Myers, supra note 279, 9 252. It is important to note that in fact there was a
comparable Canadian industry in the disposal of PCBs. Dividing the 1102 analysis
along the lines of discriminatory measures between nationals and non-nationals was a
natural result.
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ulatory measures was not without some deference to the legitimate goal of
the measure-to comply with the Basel Convention and protect the environ-
ment. 2 9 3 While recognizing the possibility that the measure was legiti-
mate, the tribunal did require proof that the measure was the "least
restrictive" means of achieving the regulatory goal. 2 94 This burden was not
met and the tribunal decided that there were alternative means of achieving
the same results without having such a discriminatory effect and violating
1102.295
After S.D. Myers, it appeared clear that NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals,
while recognizing legitimate regulatory policies, would tend to coincide
with WTO panels in collapsing measures with discriminatory effects with
those intended to discriminate between products of nationals and non-
nationals. At the same time, S.D. Myers demonstrates the willingness of
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals to incorporate legitimate regulatory measures
into the analysis of "like circumstances," focusing the comparison on
larger categories that may incorporate those measures rather than the com-
petitive substitutability of the products involved.2 96 In making these deter-
minations, however, the NAFTA tribunals also seem more inclined to defer
to the domestic regulatory framework from which the measures arose.2 97
This framework can help tribunals begin to understand the legitimacy of
the measures in place and better determine whether alternative measures
more aligned with the objectives of NAFTA could have been implemented.
Another Chapter 11 dispute between Canada and the U.S. took deference
one step further.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,2 98 while agreeing with S.D. Myers in one
respect, added a new and useful dimension in dealing with domestic regu-
latory measures in the context of national treatment. 299 In Pope & Talbot,
the investor Pope & Talbot, Inc., a publicly traded corporation incorpo-
rated under the laws of Delaware and engaged in the manufacture and sale
of softwood lumber through its Canadian wholly owned subsidiary Pope &
Talbot International Ltd., brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the
Canadian government for 1102 violations as well as other Chapter 11 viola-
tions.30 0 The majority of the sales of softwood lumber by its Canadian
293. See id. at 11 255.
294. See id.
295. Id. 255; see Sykes, supra note 54 (identifying some measures as the "least
restrictive means" of achieving a legitimate regulatory objective). Interestingly, this con-
clusion is also reminiscent of cases along the lines of Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission in the dormant Commerce Clause scenario, where facially non-
discriminatory measures with discriminatory effects on outsiders would be struck down
unless there was proof of no alternative means of obtaining the legitimate state goal. See
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
296. S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 279, c1 95-102.
297. See id.
298. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 274.
299. See id.
300. Other allegations included violations of articles 1106 and 1105. The investor
was Pope & Talbot Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of the Province of Brit-
ish Columbia, which manufactured and sold standardized and specialty wood lumber.
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subsidiary was being exported to the United States. The backdrop to this
case was the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement signed by Canada and the
U.S., under which Canada was required to place softwood lumber on the
Export Control List under Export and Imports Permits Act.3 0 ' Under this
Agreement and relevant laws, Canada required federal export permits on
each exportation to the U.S. of softwood lumber first manufactured in cer-
tain Canadian provinces covered under the Agreement. 30 2 The Canadian
government instituted fee structures for the issuance of permits for the U.S.
export of softwood lumber that was first manufactured in the covered prov-
inces for quantities above the established base in a given year.30 3 Prov-
inces placed on the export control list included British Columbia, Alberta,
Manitoba and Quebec. 30 4 All exports to the U.S. from these provinces
would require an export permit and the payment of fees. 305 The claimants
alleged that the implementation of these fee structures and permit require-
ments was intended to protect Canadian softwood lumber and hurt the
U.S. investment.30 6 The NAFTA tribunal issued a final merits award dis-
missing claims under Article 1102 and concluded that the regime was a
reasonable, albeit flawed, implementation of the Canada-U.S. Softwood
Lumber Agreement. 30 7
In defining national treatment in Pope & Talbot, Canada tried to incor-
porate a "Disproportionate Disadvantage Test", which focused on the deter-
mination of whether there were any Canadian-owned investments accorded
the same treatment as the investor.30 8 The tribunal looked at GATT cases
applying Article 111:4 and determined that panels in those cases did not
look into whether "imported products were subjected to disproportionate
disadvantage. '30 9 Canada clarified that if the measure was dejure discrim-
inatory, there would clearly be an 1102 violation. 3 10 If the measure was
facially neutral (de facto), however, the question should have been whether,
behind the neutrality, "the measure disadvantage[d] the foreign-owned
investment" in a disproportionate way. 3 1 1
Harvest in the province of BC and operated three sawmills and two forestry divisions in
that same province. See Softwood Lumber Agreement, Can.-U.S., art. It, 9 1, Apr. 1,
1996, available at http://www.dbtrade.com/casework/softwood/175976w.htm#art10.
301. In June of 1996, Canada issued SLP Export Permit Fees Regulations, introducing
an administrative fee to be paid by an exporter for the issuance of a permit in respect of
exports of softwood lumber products in the EB and for export fees to be paid for permits
in the LFB of $50 and in the UFB of $100 per thousand board feet. See id.
302. See id.
303. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 298, 30.
304. Id. 6.
305. Id. 30.
306. Id. 9 47-48.
307. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271, 99 93-95. Claims under
1105 were also dismissed. Id.
308. Id. 44.
309. Id. 99 45-72.
310. Id. 9 56.
311. Id. It becomes a matter of "rights." The Disproportionate Disadvantage Test
focuses on whether the measure disproportionately disadvantages the foreign investor as
compared to the domestic investor. It requires that there be a domestic investor "in like
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In making its final decision, the tribunal looked to its decision in S.D.
Myers, where Canada similarly alleged that the issue in 1102 was "whether
the practical effect of the measure [was] to create a disproportionate benefit
for nationals over non-nationals .... 312 The Pope & Talbot tribunal dis-
agreed with Canada and clarified that even in S.D. Myers, the focus should
be on whether the claimant and its Canadian competitors were "in like cir-
cumstances." 3 13 Once the answer was in the affirmative, "the finding of a
denial of national treatment was a foregone conclusion."3 14 Weighing dis-
proportionate advantages was not, therefore, required.
This emphasis on the "likeness" of the position of the investments
involved is again reminiscent of WTO panels' adjudication of "like prod-
ucts" in the context of Article III. In rejecting the "Disproportionate Advan-
tage" test, however, the NAFTA tribunal took an interesting approach to
discerning "like circumstances." It stated that in deciding which invest-
ments were "in like circumstances," it would consider the entire back-
ground on the softwood lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada leading
up to this dispute. 3 15 In this way, the tribunal deferred to the domestic
regulatory processes at play. It concluded that the comparison of "like cir-
cumstances" should be between the foreign owned investment and the
domestic investment "in the same business or economic sector."'3 16 In
making these comparisons, the tribunal emphasized that whether they
were "like" in the latter respect was just the first step.3 17 The more impor-
tant question was whether there were differences in their treatment; if there
were, then the presumption should be that in fact there was a violation of
national treatment. 3 18
So far, the analysis is much like the WTO application of Article III in
the context of "like products." Ultimately, the NAFTA tribunal in Pope &
Talbot was concerned, like the WTO panels, with the way in which applica-
tion of a regulatory measure affected the competitive relationship of invest-
ments "in like circumstances."31 9 However, the Pope & Talbot tribunal
took the analysis one step further: it converted the presumption of national
circumstances." It does not take into account any disparate representation that the
domestic investor has in that economic sector-that is, unless it is demonstrated that the
disadvantaged Canadian group of investors is smaller than the advantaged group, no
discrimination could exist. Canada derived this test from WTO/GATT Panel decisions,
but the tribunal shows how it is used differently in those cases. The tribunal points out
that these cases first decided if the services/goods were "in like circumstances" or deal-
ing with like products. See id. 42.
312. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271, c 65.
313. Id. 66.
314. Id. ("That is, the situation at that point was that two Canadian companies were
free to operate, while their American competitor was effectively out of business.").
315. See id. 77 (agreeing with Canada that "like circumstance" should incorporate
"the entire background of its disputes with the United States concerning softwood lum-
ber trade between the two countries").
316. The tribunal looked to the OECD's understanding of "like situations" in defining
"like circumstances" in this way. Id. 78, n.73.
317. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271, 78.
318. Id.
319. See id. T1 78-79.
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treatment into a rebuttable presumption. The tribunal concluded that if
the differences in treatment "have a reasonable nexus to rational govern-
ment policies that 1) do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between
foreign-owned and domestic companies, and 2) do not otherwise unduly
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA," the measure
is in compliance with 1102.320 Essentially, this test balances the legiti-
macy of the governmental policy against the burdens it places on the free
trade objectives of NAFTA. What constitutes a legitimate policy is left up to
the discretion of the tribunal; however, it may be framed along the lines of
(1) whether the measure discriminates (de jure or defacto) based on origin,
and (2) whether the measure is reasonably aligned with the governmental
policy.3 2 ' With such a test, the tribunal admittedly runs the risk of having
to decide on issues of legitimacy. The Pope & Talbot tribunal was clear,
however, in placing the burden on the respondent for justifying regulatory
policies "not motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned
investments."3 22 More importantly, the tribunal clarified that the issue of
"justified discrimination" should be included in determining whether the
investments are "in like circumstances." 32 3 This approach allows for dis-
tinctions to be made along the lines of larger categories, which is similar to
the suggested approach in S.D. Myers. In contrast, the WTO approach
would require that justification for discriminatory measures occur within
the stricter parameters of Article XX.
3 24
In another Chapter 11 dispute, the NAFTA tribunal again considered
domestic regulatory processes to determine whether the regulatory mea-
sure in question was legitimate. In Gami Investments, Inc. v. The Govern-
ment of the Mexico, the Chapter 11 NAFTA tribunal considered whether
governmental expropriations of a U.S. investor's sugar mills amounted to
expropriation under NAFTA and a violation of national treatment under
1102.325 Though the tribunal did not apply the same balancing test as in
Pope & Talbot, it looked closely at the administrative processes in Mexico
that decided to expropriate the sugar mills.3 26 Under the heading of "mal-
administration" in its Final Award, the tribunal considered the regulatory
framework surrounding the sugar industry in Mexico, an industry that the
Mexican government has traditionally protected.3 2 7 After owning Mexico's
sugar mills for nearly twenty years, the Mexican government implemented
320. Id. l 78.
321. See id. '99 78-79.
322. Id. 79.
323. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271., 79 ("A formulation focus-
ing on the like circumstances question, on the other hand, will require addressing any
difference in treatment, demanding that it be justified by showing that it bears a reason-
able relationship to rational policies not motivated by the preference of domestic over
foreign owned investments.").
324. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 27.
325. GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award, 9 24 (Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter GAMI Investments, Final Award]. The claimant also alleged that his investment vio-
lated the fair and equitable treatment standard under 1105. Id.
326. See id. 99 45-48.
327. See id. c 9 44-64.
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a privatization program through the Sugarcane Decree of 1991.328 The
purpose of this program was to promote private investment in the Mexican
sugar industry, while allowing the government to regulate all the different
aspects of the sugar mill industry, from planting to refining. 3 29 The pro-
gram established guidelines as to exclusive territorial agreements for the
sale of sugar to certain mills, sugar production ceilings, reference prices
and price adjustments, and the establishment of export quotas.3 30 Among
their allegations, the claimants asserted that the Mexican government
failed to properly implement these regulations, thereby necessitating a
shutdown of the sugar mills.3 3 1 The tribunal deferred to the regulatory
framework itself in deciding whether the investor could have a cause of
action against the government, but it clarified that it would only consider
whether Mexico's actions (or omissions) were a violation of international
law. 33 2 The tribunal refused to determine whether the regulations in place
were legitimate and recognized that the regulatory framework called for
governmental supervision.3 33 The tribunal instead focused on whether the
government intentionally caused the failures in the sugar program, and
whether those failures directly caused injury to the U.S. investor. 33 4
On the question of national treatment, the GAMI tribunal did not
focus on whether the nationalizations of the sugar mills were intrinsically
wrong because of their protectionist effects. Instead, it looked to whether
the nationalizations were implemented differently vis-A-vis the U.S. claim-
ant compared to other investors "in like circumstances. '335 It noted that
some of the sugar mills that were expropriated were domestic corporations
with no foreign investors. 33 6 After a brief analysis and rejection of GAMI's
argument that discrimination had occurred, the tribunal decided that the
motivation behind Mexico's decision to expropriate certain mills while
sparing others was based on the government's regulatory policy that con-
sidered it in the public interest to salvage financially troubled sugar mills to
prevent their insolvency. 3 3 7 It stated that "Mexico perceived that mills
operating in conditions of effective insolvency needed public participation
328. Id. 1 51-53.
329. See id. T9 51-58.
330. See id. 99 57-64.
331. Id., 99 73-76 (Nov. 15, 2004) (considering whether the role of the tribunal was
to determine the legitimacy and legality of the Mexican government in its implementa-
tion, or lack thereof, of relevant regulatory policy).
332. See id. 91 78. See also Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United
States, 42 I.L.M. 811, 830 Uune 26, 2003) (stating that the relevant question regarding
the Loewen trial in a Mississippi court was whether the whole trial satisfied minimum
standards of international law). In concluding in the affirmative, the tribunal in Loewen
deferred to the U.S. judicial process itself, and whether the claimant had access to the
same opportunities as nationals to benefit from the judicial process. See id. at 831-33.
The tribunal found that it did. See id.
333. See GAMI Investments, Final Award, surpa note 325, 9 76.
334. Id. 1 110.
335. See id. 1 111.
336. Id. 99cl 111-15.
337. Id. 1 114.
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in the interest of the national economy in a broad sense. '338 The NAFTA
tribunal looked to the regulatory structures in place for clarification, defer-
ring to the judgment of the government and holding that because the ends
pursued were legitimate, the means used were not discriminatory. 33 9
The GAMI decision was informed by the tribunal's initial decision that
the policy was legitimate, thereby making it possible to defer to the govern-
ment's regulatory policy throughout the opinion. If nationalization was of
only foreign-owned investments, the question may have been more difficult
for the tribunal. In the latter scenario, the tribunal might have made a
determination along the lines of Pope & Talbot. That is, it would have had
to first determine whether the foreign-owned and domestic investments
were "in like circumstances. '3 40 Then, the tribunal would decide whether
there was a reasonable nexus to a rational nondiscriminatory governmen-
tal policy and balance this against the burdens to the free trade objectives
of NAFTA.34 1
C. Comparing Systems
Despite the challenging endeavor of unveiling consistencies in interna-
tional trade tribunals, the NAFTA tribunals seem to be aligned with legal
applications of the U.S. dormant Commerce Clause in a few ways. First,
they recognize the distinction between facially discriminatory measures (de
jure) and neutral measures with discriminatory effects (de facto).3 4 2
NAFTA Tribunals and WTO jurisprudence under Article III are similar in
this respect. Furthermore, all three would agree that facially discrimina-
tory measures would clearly violate national treatment unless otherwise
justifiable. For example, a Chapter 20 NAFTA tribunal determined that a
"blanket refusal" by the U.S. to comply with its NAFTA obligations and
allow access to Mexican trucking firms was a violation of national treat-
ment.34 3 The tribunal conceded that the U.S. regulatory framework
already in place to review these applications for access could deny Mexican
firms access if they did not comply with U.S. licensing and environmental
standards, as long as those standards were not arbitrary or discriminatory
in unjustifiable ways.34 4 The tribunal treated the U.S. actions as facially
338. Id.
339. GAMI Investments, Final Award, supra note 325, e 114.
340. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 298, e 73.
341. Id. J 72.
342. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automo-
tive Industry, 91 106, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (June 19, 2000).
343. See U.S. Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01 ' 295 (Feb. 6, 2001). The alle-
gations included breaches of Articles 1202 (national treatment for cross-border ser-
vices), 1203 (most-favored nation treatment for cross-border services), and 1102
(national treatment for investment), and 1103 (most-favored nation treatment for invest-
ment as well). See id. 1 1.
344. Id. l 271. Chapter 9 grants parties the right to maintain their own technical and
licensing standards as long as in applying them, the parties comply with the obligations
of national treatment and most-favored nation status. Also, the standards themselves
must be pursuant to legitimate domestic objectives and any discriminatory treatment
must be justifiable and non-arbitrary. See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 904.
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discriminatory measures intended to protect domestic trucking companies
at the expense of Mexican trucking firms. 3 45
Second, NAFTA tribunals consider that even those neutral measures
with discriminatory effects may serve non-protectionist and legitimate reg-
ulatory goals. 346 The WTO panels would likely concede this point as well
in the context of Article 111. 34 7 However, the NAFTA tribunals, albeit a
more ad hoc system than the WTO Appellate Body, seem more aligned with
U.S. courts in finding that these measures may be valid for purposes of
national treatment only if there are no less restrictive alternatives available
to achieve the desired goal. 3 48 The WTO panels would settle these ques-
tions under the stricter framework of Article XX. 349
Third, NAFTA tribunals will look for a nexus between a facially neu-
tral regulatory measure and the legitimate government objective and then
balance this consideration against the burdens to free trade under
NAFTA. 35 0 It is unclear if NAFTA tribunals place much emphasis on dis-
tinguishing between facially neutral measures with protectionist effects
and those that only "incidentally burden" the NAFTA objectives. For the
purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that NAFTA tribunals pre-
sume a national treatment violation where a measure is intentionally pro-
tectionist or has protectionist effects.35 1 More importantly, NAFTA
tribunals recognize the possibility of legitimate regulatory policies and
defer to domestic regulatory processes in deciding their legitimacy under
international law.352 In Pope & Talbot, for example, the tribunal gave
much deference to the legitimacy of the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement
critical in the dispute.3 53
345. See U.S. Trucking Services, supra note 343, ' 247. Canada was not subjected to
the same blanket refusal to consider applications. See id.
346. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms
Still Haunt the WTO, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 575, 580 (2004) (stating that origin-neutral yet
discriminatory measures can be justified under certain circumstances).
347. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms
Still Haunt the WTO, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 575, 580 (2004) (stating that under WTO law
origin-neutral yet discriminatory measures can be justified under Article XX and XXI of
GATT).
348. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of WTO panel analysis and decisions.
349. Arguably, EC-Asbestos took a similar position. However, in EC-Asbestos, the pri-
mary focus for the Appellate Body was the products themselves, and whether the mea-
sure in question was connected to an inherent component of the product. The Appellate
Body was not as concerned with the legitimacy of the measure. See EC-Asbestos, supra
note 27, 84-185 (focusing primarily on the "like products" and then determining
whether this product fell within the scope of Article XX).
350. Cf. Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 298, 66-67 (pointing out that
according to the Vienna Convention, which is reflective of customary international law,
a governmental treaty or regulation must be looked at against relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable to the relations between the parties).
351. But cf. id. 73 (noting factors that must be considered when determining
whether a party violates NAFTA, as opposed to adopting a presumption of a national
treatment violation).
352. See ORTnNO, supra note 347, at 24.
353. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271, 76, n.69.
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This deference, however, has its limits. In Metalclad Corporation v.
United Mexican States, Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. investor, alleged that
a municipal order requiring the investor to stop all building activities
because it lacked appropriate licenses was a violation of Mexico's obliga-
tion under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.3 54 According to the U.S. investor, the
Mexican federal government had assured Metalclad that no such licenses
were required.3 55 Aside from the interesting federalism problem that the
tribunal attempted to resolve, the Chapter 11 tribunal incorrectly decided
that the lack of transparency in the domestic regulatory processes of Mex-
ico, both at the federal and state levels, were a violation. 356 Despite errors
in the tribunal's interpretation of Articles 1105 and 1110, the interesting
outcome of the early Chapter 11 case demonstrated the uninhibited will-
ingness of the tribunal to delve into the Mexican regulatory framework at
play. Mexican counsel argued that the tribunal was neither equipped to
decide on matters of Mexican domestic law nor was it the role of the tribu-
nal to do so. 35 7 The tribunal did, however, begin by looking at the domes-
tic regulatory framework at hand in deciding whether the measures arising
from that framework violated Mexican obligations under NAFTA. 358
While transparency is an important objective for NAFTA, the Chapter 11
tribunals will not enforce it as an obligation under NAFTA.3 59
IV. Creating Bridges to Regionalism
A. WTO Adjudication of Domestic Regulation After Methanex
Let us return to the initial illustrative problem concerning the Mexican
sugar industry and high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). In Corn Products, a
U.S. investor, Corn Products International, Inc., brought a Chapter 11
claim against the Mexican government for passing a tax on the soft drink
industry for beverages containing fructose, specifically HFCS-55, that alleg-
edly was intended to discriminate against the claimant and protect the
Mexican sugar industry. 3 60 The Mexican government adopted the tax,
354. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Ili 50,
65 ICSID (W.Bank) (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladFinalAward.pdf [hereinafter
Metalclad I]. The claimant Metalclad alleged violations of Articles 1105 and 1110.
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 81 B.C.L.R. (3d) ' 20 (Can.), available
at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladJudgement.pdf [here-
inafter Metalclad II].
355. See Metalclad 1, 1 33-36.
356. The tribunal interpreted Article 1105 as incorporating a transparency require-
ment. See id. 9 76; see also Metalclad II, 39[ 23, 27 (summarizing the tribunal's findings).
The Supreme Court of British Columbia later found that, with respect to 1105, the Tri-
bunal erred in determining that transparency was a requirement of 1105. See Metalclad
I, 19[ 68, 70-72.
357. See id. 9 66.
358. See Metalclad 1, 9 71, 81-84, 99.
359. See Metalclad I, 71-72.
360. See Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings by Corn Prod. Int'l, sub-
mitted pursuant to Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/1, 9 2, 23-30 ICSID (W.Bank) (Oct. 21, 2003), http://naftaclaims.com/
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which became effective on January 1, 2002, as an amendment to an older
excise tax scheme, Impuesto Especial Sobre Producci6n y Servicios ("Special
Tax on Products and Services"), which placed taxes on particular products
and services such as tobacco and alcoholic beverages, in order to supple-
ment income tax revenues. 3 6 ' The tax affected those industries using
HFCS-55 in their beverages-primarily the soda bottler industry.3 62 It did
not affect products using sugar as the sweetener.3 63
The history of sugar cane producers in Mexico reflects the paradox of
Mexican policy toward U.S. investment in sweeteners. On one hand, the
Mexican government encourages US investment in and production of high
fructose corn syrup; on the other, the Mexican government vigorously pro-
tects its traditional sugar cane production. U.S. investors, through Mexican
subsidiaries, are the chief producers of HFCS, a product derived from yel-
low corn that must be imported from the U.S because Mexico primarily
grows white corn. 364 Though HFCS must undergo several processes, an
important component of the product, HFCS-55, is also imported from the
U.S. 365 The Mexican tax measure in question was a 20% tax placed not on
HFCS itself, but on the soda industry using it as a sweetener in its soft
drinks and other beverages. 366 The tax measure affected the transfer of
these beverages, services related to their transfer (a "distribution tax"), and
other imposed "booking requirements. ' 36 7 As a result, the excise tax mea-
Disputes/Mexico/CPI/CPI%20-%20Claim.pdf [hereinafter Request for Institution of
Arbitration Proceedings]. HFCS-55 is the grade of HFCS primarily used in soft drinks
and Arancia, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Corn Products International is the only
producer in Mexico. Id. 3 27.
361. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Section B of Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement by Corn Prod. Int'l, Inc., C3 27-29,
available at http://naftactaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/CPI/CPI%/ 20-%20Intent.pdf [here-
inafter Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim]; see also Request for Institution of Arbitration
Proceedings, supra note 360, 53 (describing the tax). The soft drink industry had
been taxed in various periods of Mexican history and even prior to IEPS, there was a tax
on soft drinks. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim, supra note 361, 3 27. Specifi-
cally, the IEPS applies to the following: "Gasified or mineral waters; soft drinks; hydrat-
ing or rehydrating beverages; concentrates, powders, syrups, flavor essences and
extracts, that when diluted allow to obtain soft drinks, hydrating or rehydrating bever-
ages that use sweeteners different from sugar from cane." Id. 3 28. It also defines soft
drinks as "beverages that are not fermented, made with water, carbonated water, fruit
extracts or essences, flavoring or any other raw material, gasified or without gas, that
may contain citric acid, benzoic acid or ascorbic acid or their salts as preservatives, as
long as they contain fructose." Id. 3 28, n.13 (emphasis omitted). In 2002, Mexican
Congress decided to maintain the HFCS tax and expand its application. See id. 3 32.
362. Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 360, 1 29; see also
Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of tax measures on bottlers).
363. Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 360, 331 28-29.
364. The Mexican market for soft drinks is dominated by multinational corporations
such as Coca-Cola (71.9% of market) and Pepsi Cola (15.1% of market). See Mexico-Tax
Measures, supra note 17, 3 2.6.
365. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim, supra note 361, 3 10.
366. The tax measure was part of Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services
(Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Producci6n y Servicios) and related regulations and reso-
lutions. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, 3 2.3.
367. Id. 3l 2.2.
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sure applied "indirectly" to HFCS, in excess of how it was applied to a "like"
domestic product, namely sugar cane, the use of which was not taxed at
all.3 6
8
Corn Products International alleged that the Mexican government vio-
lated its commitment to equal national treatment under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA.369 The success of this claim turns on whether it can prove that
investment in the high fructose corn products industry is "in like circum-
stances" to investment in the sugar industry. It is unclear what force the
2005 WTO decision regarding the tax will have on the present Chapter 11
dispute. Judging from prior Chapter 11 decisions, the WTO decision
should significantly impact the tribunal's decision regarding whether the
two investments, sugar and high fructose corn syrup, are "in like circum-
stances." The tribunal may consider the historic sugar dispute between
Mexico and the U.S.; however, without a formal agreement upon which to
rely, the historic dispute will most likely not help Mexico. Whether the
sugar dispute should be resolved under a Chapter 20 dispute resolution
panel is beyond the scope of a Chapter 11 investor-dispute tribunal, and
the WTO did not address this issue in its final decision. 3 70 If the tribunal
finds a national treatment violation under Article 1102, the U.S. investor
will likely present a claim against the Mexican government for monetary
damages. This raises the question of the degree to which WTO panels
should adjudicate disputes arising from government policies applicable at
the regional level. In other words, not only should the WTO defer to trans-
parent domestic regulatory processes in determining issues of procedural
legitimacy of regulatory measures, but perhaps it should remove itself
entirely from certain issues and defer to the regional tribunals for final
adjudication. The Methanex case, decided in 2005, seems to allude to such
a solution.3 7 1
368. Id. 'H 8.26-36. The panel focused on the U.S.'s second submission, in which
the U.S. primarily argued that non-cane sweeteners such as beet sugar were "like" cane
sugar products but were treated differently:
The United States has submitted claims regarding the treatment that Mexico
accords both to imports of soft drinks and syrups and to imports of non-cane
sweeteners, such as beet sugar and HFCS. The United States emphasizes that
although the measures at issue are imposed by Mexico on soft drinks and syr-
ups, this is a dispute which fundamentally concerns the treatment accorded to
sweeteners.
See id. ' 8.3.
369. NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1102. The claimants argued that the tax was "tanta-
mount to expropriation." Article 1110 of Chapter 11 NAFTA prohibits Parties from
"directly or indirectly nationaliz[ing] or expropriat[ing] an investment of an investor of
another Party or take[ing] a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of
such investment" except for a specific public purpose. Furthermore, claimants con-
tended that the tax illegally imposed "a performance requirement on soft drink and
sweetener producers to procure and produce sweeteners made exclusively from Mexican
inputs, more particularly sugar." Article 1106 of Chapter 11 of NAFTA prevents Parties
from imposing performance requirements. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim, supra
note 361, 'IH 35-44.
370. See generally Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17.
371. See generally Methanex, Final Award, supra note 8.
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Methanex was a NAFTA Chapter 11 case where the Canadian investor
alleged that California bans on the use of methanol for reformulated gaso-
line violated several commitments under the investment protection chapter
of NAFTA, including national treatment (1102), 3 72 fair and equitable treat-
ment (1105), 3 7 3 and expropriation (1110). 3 7 4 In its national treatment
claim, the claimant attempted to defer to WTO decisions regarding "like
products" in arguing that ethanol investments and methanol investments
are "in like circumstances. ' 375  Specifically, Methanex looked to
EC-Asbestos as well as S.D. Myers to argue that competition was the litmus
test for likeness.3 76 Methanex claimed that methanol producers are "in
like circumstances" to ethanol producers because they both compete in the
oxygenate market, and customers perceive the two as interchangeable. 37 7
Then, applying the test in Pope & Talbot, the claimant stated that once less
favorable treatment had been established, the burden shifted to the respon-
dent to justify such treatment on the basis that it furthered a legitimate
regulatory objective, in this case, environmental protection. 3 78 The tribu-
nal decided that the "comparator" in this case should be other methanol
producers, and, as to them, the ban was uniform and applied to all MTBE
producers. 37 9 Therefore, there was no 1102 violation because there was no
less favorable treatment.38 0 In agreeing with the U.S., the tribunal consid-
ered the differences between ethanol and methanol and concluded that the
two products were not "like products" because competition between them
was not sufficient. 38 1 Furthermore, the ban on methanol was authorized
by U.S. federal law, and the two products did not share the same tariff
classification under the Harmonized System of Tariffs. 38 2 Interestingly,
the U.S. argued that even in applying the EC-Asbestos test for "like prod-
ucts," there was no less favorable treatment because the measure's pur-
pose-to prevent a health and environmental hazard-was legitimate, and
this fact should be considered in the "likeness" test.3 83 Though this argu-
ment seems to coincide with current WTO jurisprudence regarding the
adjudication of regulatory measures, the tribunal made a surprising turn.
372. Methanex did not originally bring the claim for breach of 1102 NAFTA, but
introduced it in the draft Amended Statement of Claim of February 12, 2001. See id.
Part IV, ch. C, '1 3.
373. Id. Part 11, ch. D, 27.
374. Id. cl 28.
375. Id. Part IV, ch. B, ' 7-8.
376. Methanex, Final Award, supra note 8, Part IV, ch. B, c 5.
377. Id. c1c 6-7.
378. Id. 1 9. Methanex explained that the analysis under 1102 required a three-step
analysis: 1) a determination of "like circumstances;" 2) a determination of less favorable
treatment; 3) if there is less favorable treatment, the respondent must prove legitimacy in
the regulatory measure. The U.S. argued that the 1102 analysis should focus on dis-
crimination on "the basis of nationality of ownership of an investment." See id. 111
13-14.
379. Id. 9l 21.
380. Id.
381. Id. 1 28.
382. Id. 91 24.
383. Id. 91 25.
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It stated that the "like products" test used by the WTO panels did not nec-
essarily apply to "like circumstances" under the Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
38 4
The tribunal thus chose not to defer to WTO jurisprudence in this
instance. Instead, the tribunal looked at other uses of "like" in NAFTA and
concluded that the drafters did not intend that "trade provisions ... be
transported to investment provisions."38 5 This decision seemed to assert
the authority and the independence of the regional tribunal in light of
cases similar to those already resolved under WTO jurisprudence.
In Mexico-Tax Measures, the WTO panel noted that Mexico did not
respond to the U.S. claims of sugar and HFCS being "like" products.
38 6
Mexico actually conceded that HFCS and cane sugar were substitutable
products "in certain applications. '3 8 7 Mexico took the position, however,
that the tax measure was "necessary" to obtain U.S. compliance with
NAFTA and its prior agreements with Mexico regarding sugar market
access. 38 8 Furthermore, Mexico claimed that the measure was not a dis-
guised trade barrier, because any protectionist intent in the measure was
justifiable under Article III, due to its dispute with the U.S. regarding U.S.
market access for its sugar exports, as well as social and economic difficul-
ties for the Mexican sugar industry resulting from this dispute. 3 89 The
WTO panel decided it did have jurisdiction to decide the matter, and it did
not defer resolution of the problem to a Chapter 20 NAFTA dispute resolu-
tion body.390 As a matter of GATT law, the WTO panel had jurisdiction;
however, after Methanex, its decision may not necessarily be dispositive for
the final resolution of Corn Products under a Chapter 11 NAFTA tribunal.
In making its final decision, the WTO Panel in Mexico-Tax Measures
primarily followed Japan-Alcoholic Beverages in its analysis regarding Arti-
cle 1II, concluding that sweeteners made of cane sugar and those made of
non-cane, such as HFCS, were "like" products according to the Border Tax
Adjustments factors.3 9 1 The panel proceeded to decide affirmatively that
Mexico was applying the internal tax "in excess of those applied, directly or
384. Id. IN 33-35.
385. Id. 1 37 (concluding that "Article 1102 ... [should] be read on its own terms and
not as if the words 'any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods' appeared in it").
386. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, 91 4.148.
387. Id. 91 4.113.
388. Id. 9191 4.115-4.122. Mexico also claimed that the tax measure came under an
exception under Article XX(d) which provides an exception for discriminatory measures
that are "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of [GATT]." See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
389. Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, 1 4.135.
390. Id. 91 4.150-4.157.
391. Id. 91 4.57-4.58. Border tax adjustments relate to several provisions of GATT,
including Article Ill, in attempting to require domestic governments to implement tax
schemes that treat domestically consumed products in the same manner whether the
products are produced domestically or imported. See generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 25, at 295. Whether the products fall under the same
tariff classification (HTS) is an important factor in determining similar physical charac-
teristics but it in itself is not conclusive. See Report of the Working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments, supra note 126, 91 18; see also 1987 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note
106, 91 3.3.
253
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indirectly to like domestic products."39 2 Finally, the panel examined
whether there was a violation of Article 111:2, sentence 2.3 93 It decided, as
in its analysis of Article 111:2 sentence 1, that (1) the products were "directly
competitive or substitutable products" according to the Border Tax Adjust-
ments; and (2) the "like" products were "not similarly taxed."'3 94 Then the
panel proceeded to conclude that this tax was indeed implemented "so as
to afford protection to domestic production. '3 95 In doing so, the panel first
characterized the products as "like" by again applying the Border Tax
Adjustments criteria. 3 96 Finally, the panel concluded that the tax also vio-
lated Article 111:4 by treating non-cane sweeteners less favorably than cane
sweeteners. 3 9 7 Consistent with EC-Asbestos, the panel found that "the
scope of 'like' in Article 111:4 is broader than the scope of 'like' in Article
111:2, first sentence." 398 Therefore, there was no need to determine their
"likeness" under Article 111:4 once their likeness had already been estab-
lished under Article II1:2.3 99 The panel did not consider whether the fiscal
measure was legitimate under the circumstances.
The effect of Mexico-Tax Measures with respect to Article III is three-
fold. First, it solidifies the WTO's views on Article III, at least in the con-
text of fiscal measures under Article 111:2, and its determination of "like
products," as established by the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages. Second, it applies this national treatment standard not only to
the "like products" themselves but also to the components of finished prod-
ucts that are competitive and interchangeable. 40 0 Even more so than
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, the panel did not distinguish between the intent
of the tax measure and its effects, probably because the measure was
clearly protectionist from its inception, and even Mexico conceded this
point to some extent.40 1 Rather, in its determination of whether the tax
was passed "so as to afford protection to domestic production," the panel
based its conclusion on whether the products were "like" and treated
392. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17,11918.37-8.59; see also GATT, supra note
1, art. I1, 2:1.
393. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, c9 8.66.
394. Id. 11 8.37-8.59.
395. Id. 9° 8.66-8.96. In deciding whether the tax was applied "so as to afford pro-
tection," the panel, though cautioning against giving too much importance to the "sub-
jective legislative intent of legislators and regulators in the drafting of a particular
measure," focused on comments made during a meeting of the Mexican Chambers of
Deputies annulling the tax exemption. Ironically, the reasons given for such annulment
appear to be because the tax did not achieve the fiscal and non-fiscal objectives, includ-
ing the protection of the cane sugar industry. See id. 11 8.91-8.95.
396. Id. 9 8.102-8.106.
397. Id. l 8.123.
398. Id. q 8.105.
399. See Roessler, supra note 92, at 24-25 (stating that the "no less favorable" of
Article 111:4 is to be applied to Article 111:2 in determining discriminatory treatment).
400. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, 11 8.42-8.45 (recognizing that the
Mexican tax measure was an "indirect" tax on HFCS and that it can still be in violation
of Article III due to high burdens it places on HFCS, a component of the finished prod-
uct that is subject to the tax).
401. See id.
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unequally. 40 2 The panel never considered whether its aim was based on
legitimate regulatory objectives or the extent to which the effects of the tax
furthered such an aim. Furthermore, the panel did not take into account
the regulatory framework of the Mexican government regarding sugar, as
was done in GAMI Investments in the Chapter 11 NAFTA context.40 3 If the
WTO panel had focused on the regulatory framework for sugar in Mexico,
the outcome would probably have been similar to the GAMI case. Actually,
a closer look at the Mexican legislature's argument for passing the tax
would have just reinforced the idea that the tax was indeed protection-
ist.40 4 Perhaps in this case, the measure was clearly de jure protectionist
and not facially neutral; therefore, no deference was even necessary. Under
the "deference" model, however, the adjudicatory process would have
required any questions of legitimacy (if there were some) to be "remanded"
back to the Mexican democratic process. If the democratic institution clos-
est to the measure, namely the Mexican legislature, were unable to prove
either a legitimate purpose for the measure or the existence of alternative
means more aligned with its GATT commitments, the WTO panel should
strike down the measure. In this way, WTO panels can encourage trans-
parency within the regulatory structures at the domestic level and have a
greater impact on the implementation of domestic policy without taking an
omniscient position. Furthermore, the WTO panels can suggest that cer-
tain issues, such as the U.S.-Mexico sugar dispute, be better settled at the
regional level through bilateral negotiations and regional tribunals that are
closer to the problems at hand.
This brings us back to the question of whether the WTO panels
should defer to its member states in dealing with domestic regulatory mea-
sures under Article III. More specifically, should the WTO panels defer to
the relevant regional tribunals in the final resolution of a specific dispute?
The WTO panel in Mexico -Tax Measures concluded that it had jurisdiction
to decide the issue in this case. 40 5 More importantly, however, it declined
to defer final resolution of the dispute to the NAFTA dispute resolution
body.40 6 The complexity of this omission lies in the fact that its determi-
nation of the validity of the measure under national treatment standards
may impact the decision at the regional level. Methanex seemed to assert
the authority of a regional tribunal to resolve national treatment problems
concerning foreign investment independently of WTO adjudication of reg-
ulatory policies affecting those investments. 40 7 In doing so, the regional
tribunal seemed to recognize the close relationship between private invest-
ment and government behavior through regulation. 408 Herein lies the dis-
connectedness of the multilateral trade regime as it pertains to Article III.
402. Id. ' 8.85.
403. See generally id.; see also GAMI Investments, Final Award, supra note 325, ' 45.
404. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, c 4.71-4.97.
405. See id. 9 7.4.
406. See id. ' 8.232.
407. See Methanex, Final Award, supra note 8, Part IV, ch. B, c 15.
408. Id.
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B. Reciprocal Deference Encourages Bridge-Building
Reconciling the domestic need for regulation with the GATT objective
of eliminating trade barriers is not an easy task for the WTO panels. How-
ever, there are various instances where they are forced to entertain this
apparent conflict. Article III is an important provision in dealing with this
issue, particularly because of its relevance to comparable provisions in
WTO Covered Agreements as well as in regional agreements such as
NAFTA.40 9 Regional tribunals, while tailoring GATT interpretations of
"like products" to the specific regional concerns and issues, will neverthe-
less defer to WTO decisions in this regard. 4 10 Therefore, in making its
decisions, the WTO panel should consider the effects of these judicial
determinations. It is difficult to say, for example, how the recent HFCS
case decided by the WTO will impact Mexico's obligations to the U.S.
investor under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. While not necessarily deciding
issues relevant to domestic regulatory policy or to regional concerns, WTO
panels can help create cohesiveness within the multilateral trading regime
by becoming a forum for discussion of legitimate regulatory policies.
EC-Asbestos was one step in this direction. 4 11
A balancing test, such as that used by U.S. courts in the context of the
dormant Commerce Clause, may not be so helpful in adjudicating regula-
tory measures within the context of Article III. Such a balancing test would
purport to balance the need for the regulatory measure as a means of fur-
thering legitimate non-protectionist domestic objectives against the bur-
dens such a measure places on trade. 4 12 A "cost-benefit" balancing test of
this kind is probably unrealistic for the WTO and trade agreements in gen-
eral.4 13 Such a test cannot, for example, distinguish between less organ-
ized special interest groups and more influential organized groups that
may benefit the most from passing certain regulations. 4 14 Furthermore, it
would require WTO panels to make substantive determinations as to the
legitimacy of a regulatory measure per domestic law. 41 5 While the WTO
dispute settlement system is probably not in the best position to make such
409. See S.D. Myers, Partial Award, supra note 274, 1 244.
410. See id.
411. See generally EC-Asbestos, supra note 27.
412. See Sykes, supra note 54, at 31, 42.
413. Id. at 4-5 (stating that trade agreements do not generally incorporate a balanc-
ing test). Professor Sykes explains that the lack of a "cost-benefit" analysis in trade
agreements is primarily because it does not properly deal with political special interest
groups that may reap most of the benefits of certain allowances under a trade agree-
ment. He states:
[I]f rigorous cost-benefit analysis were the touchstone of policy, virtually all tar-
iffs, quotas, and subsidies would fail to pass muster because of the deadweight
losses evident .... Those measures, and others like them, survive because politi-
cal officials care not only about the magnitude of costs and benefits, but also
about their incidence. Modest benefits to a well-organized interest group can
readily outweigh larger costs to a diffuse and poorly organized interest group in
the political calculus.
Id. at 31.
414. Id. at 31-32.
415. See id. at 32-33.
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determinations or to weigh the benefits of a certain regulation to a member
state against the net costs of such a regulation to other member states, the
WTO can provide a forum for discussion of regulatory measures through
its adjudication of Article Ill. WTO panels can provide a procedural mech-
anism that allows for deference to its member states for facially non-dis-
criminatory regulatory measures with discriminatory effects. 4 16 In this
instance, the mechanism would task member state respondents with prov-
ing the legitimacy of their regulatory measures according to their own
transparent regulatory schemes. 4 17 Furthermore, it would allow for recog-
nition that certain regional disputes are best resolved at the regional level.
In the spirit of Professors McGinnis and Movsesian, an "antidis-
crimination approach" to WTO adjudication of domestic regulatory mea-
sures is helpful in the application of Article III of GATT, though to a lesser
degree if the contested measure does not deal with labor, the environment,
health, and safety. 4 18 This approach is illuminating in that it distinguishes
between facially discriminatory measures and non-discriminatory mea-
sures with incidental effects on trade, attempting to deal with only those
that amount to "covert protectionism." In deciding whether products in
question are "like," WTO panels may consider the regulatory measure and
its effects on the competitive relationship of the products. At the outset,
panels should treat de jure and de facto discriminatory measures differ-
ently. With de jure discriminatory measures, the current application of the
"like products" test may be sufficient, as in cases like Mexico-Tax Mea-
sures.4 19 Any exemption to Article III may then be pursued by respondents
under the stricter Article XX analysis. 4 20 In cases with facially neutral
measures (de facto), however, WTO panels should distinguish between
those that have discriminatory effects and those that are non-discrimina-
tory but place "incidental burdens" on trade. WTO panels should create a
procedural framework to better assess these covert measures. The frame-
work must function within the context of Article III and the definition of
"like," where the question of legitimacy first arises. If the regulatory mea-
sure is (1) transparent; (2) consistent with other comparable regulations
affecting similar products; and (3) performance-oriented in that it is in line
with objective standards for the area in question, then the panel may infer
that the measure is legitimate and should be considered in the determina-
tion of "like products."'42 1 In making these determinations, however, the
WTO panels must defer to national democratic and transparent regulatory
416. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 572-83.
417. This deferential approach would be more in line with the "antidiscrimination
model" of the WTO than the regulatory model. However, it does not eliminate the possi-
bility of a regulatory model approach in other instances. See generally McGinnis & Mov-
sesian, supra note 46.
418. See id. at 566-72.
419. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 17, ' 9.
420. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 590.
421. See discussion regarding the three requirements proposed by Professors McGin-
nis and Movsesian of transparency, performance orientation, and consistency. Id. at
573-77.
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processes to the extent they exist. Objective criteria should be used, but
science may not always be the benchmark. Within this procedural frame-
work, responding member states should have the burden of proving the
legitimacy of their regulatory measures, and that no alternative means of
accomplishing relevant public objectives exist. Finally, where a certain
measure is best assessed at the regional level, such as in the case of Mexi-
can sugar policies against the U.S., a WTO panel should defer to a regional
tribunal, where possible, for final adjudication.
WTO panels may borrow from NAFTA tribunals in evaluating possi-
ble national treatment violations in their consideration of legitimate regula-
tory policy. Chapter 11 tribunals place the burden on the respondent to
show that regulatory policies "not motivated by preference of domestic
over foreign owned investments. '42 2 WTO panels, too, may place such a
burden on respondent governments by making domestic legislatures
accountable for policies in conflict with their obligations under GATT.
4 23
It is within the domestic regulatory framework that the problems of special
interest group bargaining and the effects of capture can best be addressed.
Therefore, regional tribunals can better assess the costs and benefits of
domestic regulatory policies concerning regional agreements in a Pope &
Talbot-style balancing test.4 2 4
Until states decide the role of the WTO vis-a-vis their own national
sovereignty, the WTO should be a forum for bargaining among its mem-
bers.4 25 In deciding which regulatory measures are not protectionist, the
WTO panels should give member states the opportunity to prove their mea-
sures' legitimacy. While deference to member states may not be appropri-
ate in every circumstance, a WTO panel performs best in asking the
domestic institution closest to the implementation of such measure to
"clarify" issues of legitimacy.4 26 While deferring, WTO panels do not nec-
essarily abdicate their roles of adjudicator and facilitator of free trade.
Rather, they embrace those roles within a global framework that incorpo-
rates multiple sovereign interests. For this reason, in adjudicating regula-
tory measures under Article III, WTO panels should shift the burden onto
422. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits, supra note 271, 1 79.
423. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 566.
424. See id. at 567.
425. See generally Steinberg, supra note 45, at 263-69 (arguing that the WTO Appel-
late Body's decision are influenced by politics-both internally through the selection of
Appellate Body members and externally through political bargaining among the most
powerful member states, which in turn must deal with domestic special interest groups
in deciding trade matters); see also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 581 (stat-
ing that their proposed procedural test for covert protectionist measures "would permit
nations to make their own trade-offs between labor, environmental, health, and safety
goals on the one hand, and economic growth on the other, so long as the nations do not
discriminate against imports").
426. See Robert Hudec,Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTER-
EST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9 (Michael M. Hart &
Debra P. Steger eds., 1992) (discussing European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and considering the preferred option of the WTO
Appellate Body deferring to its member states in that case).
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respondents and their legislatures to prove the legitimacy of regulatory
measures rather than ignore questions of legitimacy behind the strict for-
malism of the "like products" test. This should occur within the scope of
Article III and should not be confined solely to the high threshold of
"necessity" under Article XX exceptions. In this way, the WTO can
encourage its members to develop regulatory processes that are more
transparent.
Because of the binding nature of its determinations, the WTO dispute
resolution body can exert quite a bit of influence on its members. 42 7 Mem-
bers may be deterred from ignoring panel determinations because of the
retaliatory power of their counterparts under the GATT. Such retaliation
may, however, lead to continued paralysis for the involved parties and frus-
tration of any real resolution of the dispute at hand.4 28 In this way, the
WTO panels may unwittingly undermine confidence in the legitimacy of
the multilateral trade regime. The WTO should derive its legitimacy in
adjudicating matters of domestic regulatory policies from standards estab-
lished by domestic regulatory structures and not from higher norms the
WTO purportedly creates. 4 29 Those standards may evolve within the legal
regimes of its member states, and the WTO may impact this evolution by
using the decision-making power of its dispute resolution body to make
domestic governments accountable from within their legal regimes. The
WTO should not, however, alienate its members by adhering to strict for-
malism or ignoring domestic political processes. 4 30 In inviting such dia-
logue, the WTO recognizes the possibility of legitimate regulatory
measures that are independent of the domestic regulatory scheme and
derive authority solely from the WTO. 4 3 1 In adjudicating these measures
under Article III, the WTO panels may best align the objectives of GATT
with their role as facilitators of free trade.
C. Applying Reciprocal Deference
A reciprocal deference approach to the WTO mimics the antidis-
crimination model to the extent that it favors a procedural deference to
decisions of domestic regulatory agencies when the WTO adjudicates
domestic measures. This deference to the procedures of the domestic regu-
latory agencies is designed to promote democracy and transparency within
427. See Dillon, supra note 232, at 387-88 (describing the remedies against members
found to be in violation of GATT, including retaliation).
428. See Steinberg, supra note 45, at 266 (explaining that some members may attempt
to delegitimize WTO decisions through noncompliance which would then lead to
"authorized retaliation" among member states). The author goes on to explain that non-
compliance, despite the threat of retaliation, may be preferable to compliance for certain
member states. See id.
429. Hudec Comment, supra note 235, at 297 (stating that as a part of domestic poli-
cymaking, the WTO must meet the "standards of legitimacy that national governments
must meet when they exercise power" and these standards may be complex).
430. See id. at 298 (stating that the WTO "is a member-driven organization, and the
force of its orders is the product of a process in which governments agree to participate
and which they ultimately control").
431. See id.
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those systems. 43 2 The reciprocal deference approach is nonetheless differ-
ent in that it contemplates a multilateral system in which domestic regula-
tory structures and regional tribunals will occasionally defer to the WTO
decisions.4 33 This approach would allow for fluidity and put pressure on
both sides of the problem-the domestic and regional side as well as the
international side-so as to sustain a bridge between the two. Domestic
governments enforce WTO decisions, and regional tribunals may look to
WTO jurisprudence for guidance in their own adjudicatory power. This is
clear. However, in what ways should the WTO panels "defer"?
In applying Article III, the WTO panels should treat de jure and de
facto discriminatory measures differently. For de jure discriminatory mea-
sures, the stricter "like products" test based on the competitive relationship
of the products and their substitutability may suffice. This, for example, is
the case for Mexico-Tax Measures. In larger bilateral disputes that involve
the measure in question, such as the sugar dispute between the U.S. and
Mexico in the case of Mexico-Tax Measures and Corn Products, the WTO
panel should encourage the issue to be resolved at the regional level. The
panel can state that the national treatment problem at hand is part of a
larger dispute that cannot be resolved by the WTO and should be by the
NAFTA tribunal.
With respect to de facto measures, WTO panels should distinguish
between those having discriminatory effects and those that are non-dis-
criminatory but still place "incidental burdens" on trade. With the latter,
the panels should not be as concerned. With the former, the panels can
apply a procedural mechanism that assesses (1) the transparency of the
measure; (2) its consistency with comparable regulations affecting similar
products; and (3) its consistency with objective standards regarding the
public goal that the government is trying to achieve. 43 4 If there is a posi-
tive assessment of these three factors, the inference should be that the mea-
sure is legitimate. To ensure that governments do not hide behind
sophisticated regulatory structures that may pass seemingly goal-oriented
measures that are really meant to be protectionist, the panels must still
place the burden on the respondent to prove the legitimacy of these stan-
dards according to domestic law and demonstrate that no alternative
means more in line with WTO law exists. Of course, less developed
nations may argue that "requiring" transparency in this way is not fair to
them because their regulatory institutions are less developed and may not
have the information-gathering power necessary to conform to WTO stan-
dards. 43 5 This is a fair objection to my claim; however, reciprocal defer-
432. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 46, at 566.
433. See id. (discussing the deference in an antidiscrimination model to regional and
national laws rather than to a multilateral body's regulations).
434. See id. at 573-74 (discussing in the context of the antidiscrimination model the
three requirements of transparency, performance orientation, and consistency). See also
supra, Part lI.B.
435. See generally David Parker & Colin Kirkpatrick, Researching Economic Regulation
in Developing Countries: Developing a Methodology for Critical Analysis, in CENTRE ON
REGULATION AND COMPETITION: WORKING PAPER SERIES PAPER #34 (Fiona Wilson ed.,
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ence is meant to encourage transparency, not punish nations for their
inability to achieve it. Therefore, the international community, through the
auspices of the WTO, should have a way of providing technical assistance
in these situations.4 36
The EC-Asbestos case provides a good example of the application of
reciprocal deference procedure. There, the WTO Appellate Body consid-
ered the legitimacy of the measure in assessing whether chrysotile asbestos
fibers were "like" PCG fibers.4 3 7 It considered the reason for the French
Decree and noted that the fact that the asbestos fibers were carcinogenic
was an important factor in determining their "unlikeness. '4 38 In applying
a reciprocal deference approach, the panel would first place this Decree in
the category of a neutral measure with discriminatory effects. Then it
would assess whether the Decree was (1) transparent (it was authorized
through a transparent democratic process); (2) consistent with other mea-
sures on similar products (though the measure did not affect other fibers,
the panel could look at analogous measures to protect health); and (3)
passed according to objective standards (in this case scientific evidence of
its carcinogenic aspects) to further legitimate social goals (namely, health).
The panel could then infer that in fact the products are not "like" and that
the Decree is legitimate. The French government would still have the bur-
den, however, of proving that the measure is legitimate according to French
law and was not passed for protectionist purposes. The outcome would
thus have been the same as it was in the actual EC-Asbestos ruling. How-
ever, not all cases are as "clean" as EC-Asbestos (where one of the products
is deadly). Nonetheless, the reciprocal deference approach would also help
in dealing with more challenging facially neutral measures.
In this way, WTO panels would recognize that not all regulatory mea-
sures are protectionist and would impose some criteria for assessing the
discriminatory effects of the measures on free trade. Reciprocal deference
recognizes that domestic governments will pass regulatory measures for
legitimate reasons, but it also guides member states as to their commit-
ments under GATT. At the same time, it allows the WTO to take on the
role of an adjudicatory body rather than a supranational institution impos-
ing standards. Finally, it gives the WTO panels freedom to adjudicate only
in areas under its jurisdiction without dismissing areas that must be
resolved at the regional level. WTO panels can state which issues are
under its jurisdiction, recognize the impact these decisions may have at the
regional level, and push regional tribunals to decide matters within their
own jurisdiction. In this way, sustainable bridges between multilateral and
regional trade regimes may form, creating a tighter international network.
2002) (discussing the various problems with developing nation's regulatory systems and
the wide range of progress in development).
436. Many thanks to Rob Howse for his suggestions regarding technical assistance in
this context.
437. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 27, at 30.
438. Id. 11 27, 30, 32.
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Conclusion
An apparent conflict exists within the WTO multilateral regime in the
adjudication of domestic regulatory measures of its member states under
Article III of GATT. The more formalistic application of the traditional
"like products" test runs the risk of invalidating legitimate domestic regula-
tory measures, particularly those that are facially neutral (de facto). The
less formalistic approach under the "aims and effects" test requires WTO
panels to determine the legitimate purpose of the measure in question as a
matter of substantive law. Though the latter approach is more deferential
to the sovereign right of member states to regulate domestically, it places a
high burden on WTO panels to decide issues of legitimacy concerning
domestic law.
The current "like products" test applied by WTO panels to adjudicate
domestic regulatory policy, while attempting to deal with regulatory mea-
sures such as in EC-Asbestos, fails to answer important questions regard-
ing the legitimacy of domestic regulatory measures. The WTO may learn
from similar discussions in other areas of WTO law as well as under the
U.S. dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the NAFTA decisions.
Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has the authority to decide issues of legit-
imacy with respect to state regulatory policy and balance the interests of
the state with those of Congress, the WTO panels cannot claim this same
authority. As the gatekeeper of the multilateral trade regime, WTO panels,
nonetheless, do have the responsibility of enforcing compliance with the
GATT objectives. In this way, the WTO takes the form of a regulatory
model. The WTO dispute resolution bodies may make substantive deci-
sions as to international law under WTO Covered Agreements; however,
they should not do the same with respect to domestic law. WTO panels
must encourage coordination and transparency within the domestic regula-
tory structures of its member states through procedural mechanisms that
make member states accountable for their internal regulatory policies. As
done by NAFTA tribunals, WTO panels should apply greater deference to
transparent domestic regulatory processes when answering questions of
legitimacy with respect to domestic regulatory measures and alleged viola-
tions of national treatment requirements under Article III. While this
approaches an antidiscrimination model for the WTO, such deference
should not be absolute. Rather, it should be in the form of inferences and
burden-shifting; that is, even if the procedural mechanism raises an infer-
ence of no national treatment violation, WTO panels should require that
respondent member states show that their domestic legislatures have
proven "no alternative means" of furthering legitimate domestic goals not
in violation of GATT. In this way, domestic democratic processes can
allow for greater accountability, and the WTO can affect compliance at its
source.
By deferring to domestic regulatory structures as a procedural matter,
WTO panels may place the burden of proving legitimacy on those institu-
tions closest to the implementation of the measure. In doing this, the WTO
would also encourage active participation from domestic governments in
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the multilateral trade regime. Proof of legitimacy should be within certain
parameters set by the WTO panels. To borrow from the U.S. dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, WTO panels should require proof of "no
alternative means" of furthering legitimate domestic policy that would be
more closely aligned with commitments under GATT. By "remanding"
such questions of legitimacy, the WTO is not taking on an autonomous
role as the ultimate judge of domestic regulatory policy. Rather, it becomes
an important internal player nudging domestic democratic political
processes in the direction of compliance with commitments under GATT.
In this way, the WTO panels also encourage domestic regulatory
frameworks to be transparent in passing regulatory policy. WTO panels
cannot ignore their impact on the execution of regional agreements and
should recognize that some issues would be better settled there. In addi-
tion, WTO panels can exert a more positive influence at the domestic level
without alienating member states when strict formalism is inappropriate.
The WTO, through its adjudicatory power, can weave a tight web of influ-
ence at the domestic level, binding the multilateral regime together while
maintaining its role as external gatekeeper of the regime.
Furthermore, when the WTO promotes coordination within the multi-
lateral regime, WTO panels should recognize the impact of WTO decisions
at the regional level. Regional tribunals such as the NAFTA Chapter 11
tribunals will defer to WTO decisions in applying provisions of regional
agreements. Perhaps this deference allows for more adhesiveness within
the multilateral regime as well. However, WTO panels cannot simply
ignore this tendency; they must also recognize that some disputes may be
better resolved at the regional level while still deciding matters where it
clearly has jurisdiction. For this reason, WTO panels should exhibit proce-
dural deference to regional agreements and domestic regulatory structures
when examining regulatory measures. This deference will help solidify the
desired coordination. A reciprocal deference approach will continue to
encourage domestic regulatory institutions to follow commitments under
the GATT agreements while allowing WTO panels to better influence those
same institutions. For it is within its web of influence at the domestic level
that the WTO can truly have an impact in pushing member states toward
economic integration and globalization.

